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FSD works to stimulate pro-poor change in the dynamic context of the financial 
market in Kenya.  In doing so it engages with the complex, systemic, emergent 
and uncertain world that is the territory of complexity theory.   This research set 
out to explore whether and in what ways evaluation and impact assessment 
can more effectively take into account this context.
Complexity theory emphasises that the world is:
   Systemic and synergistic.
   Shaped by history and context.
   Episodic in the way change happens.
   Evolving, where emergent features arise which could not have been 
known in advance.
Using this understanding of this complex world, the research was exploratory 
and had three purposes:
   To explore whether the contexts in which FSD works do indeed reflect 
this complexity.
   To enquire into the extent to which project teams responded to this 
complexity.
   To develop methods of impact assessment which assess impact in 
dynamic, evolving environments where there are many influences and 
actors.
The research focused on two projects – the development of a Credit Information 
Sharing (CIS) scheme for Kenya and the implementation of savings groups 
in West Kenya.  It drew on and developed certain theory-based methods of 
impact assessment to examine impact both retrospectively and prospectively. 
 The first method traces the history of the project within its context through 
interviewing key stakeholders. The questions were designed to explore what 
happened, why, and what other wider factors were relevant. The respondents 
were also asked to consider what impact the project has made or is making. 
These core narratives were then triangulated, and, through second interviews 
with some respondents, any anomalies or areas of particular interest were 
further explored. Secondary data from written material was also used.  
 
Using the resultant histories or traces of the project, we were first able to show 
that the project teams were responding to the complexity of the situation: 
dealing with unexpected changes in the wider context, with unexpected 
situations which had not been planned for, experimenting and customising 
approaches as necessary and seizing opportunities. So, the method both 
demonstrated that the world is complex in the way complexity theory infers 
and that project teams, in the main, are adept at responding to this complexity. 
This response to complexity is often achieved by project staff de-emphasising 
overly-constrained plans and processes that do not anticipate the importance 
of context and emergent change.
This method, which sought in an open-ended way to discover what did 
happen rather than to be constrained by what was intended to happen, also 
gave information about contribution to impact through following the sequence 
of events. This highlighted the impacts that, in the eyes of respondents, had 
occurred or were beginning to emerge.  It produced indications of where 
corroborating information could be sought or monitored.
The second approach was more prospective in nature. Through interviewing 
groups of stakeholders, and exploring what was happening in relation to the 
project and its wider context, it was possible to collect ‘narrative fragments’ 
that gave evidence of emerging changes and trends that were still ‘growing 
shoots’ or ‘weak signals’ but were not necessarily yet amenable to quantitative 
analysis. This method was able to show the beginnings of impact pathways 
which went beyond the intended theory of change. It gave indications of where 
project teams might monitor some of these trends, where consideration needs 
to be given as to how these growing impacts might help or hinder the core 
intentions of the project and how this might inform programming practice as 
well as provide a more complex view of what had been achieved.
The report concludes by discussing the implications of these findings for 
programming, evaluation and impact assessment.  It suggests ways in which 
FSD can embed these practices in the management processes of the projects 
and programme as a whole. This would allow FSD both to undertake effective 
impact monitoring which better informs project and programme development 
and to provide input into retrospective impact assessment studies.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Chapter 1
WHY COMPLEXITY? THE COMPLEX NATURE  
OF FSD’S WORK AND CONTEXT
The Financial Sector Deepening Trust was established in 2005 to support the 
development of financial markets in Kenya as a means to stimulate wealth 
creation and reduce poverty1. The financial market is undergoing rapid and 
far-reaching changes and there are a range of inter-related driving forces and 
uncertainties which will shape how the market evolves, as FSD’s strategy 
clearly demonstrates.  These include: growing communication networks 
offering new channels and opening the market to new entrants; changing 
demographics with a growing youth sector; urban migration; decentralisation; 
changing policy and regulatory frameworks.
FSD’s approach is to influence the evolution of the market in ways that are 
pro-poor. In order to do this FSD engages in a range of projects and activities. 
FSD’s work - in being innovative and working in dynamic contexts to stimulate 
change - engages with the complex, systemic, emergent, uncertain world 
that is the territory of complexity theory.   FSD exemplifies many examples of 
response to this complexity. It acts to analyse, anticipate and ‘foresight’ 2 the 
future – making judgments as to how the market and its determining factors 
will develop. It builds relationships and engages with key stakeholders in order 
to gain insight and to be in a position to influence future strategies. It seeks to 
be adept at seizing opportunities to catalyse changes that support poverty 
reduction. It supports innovation and invests in and demonstrates new ways 
of working.  And sometimes it persists with and supports ventures that are less 
popular with the mainstream but nevertheless are judged to be important for 
poverty reduction (see Box 7).  
FSD faces a number of challenges in evaluating and assessing the impact of its 
work as a whole, as well as for particular projects and programmes.  The focus 
of the research described in this report is to investigate what complexity theory 
has to offer to considerations of how FSD can evaluate and assess the impact 
of its work.  However, this inevitably raises issues related to how programmes 
are designed and the report therefore also addresses aspects of design and 
implementation. 
This research addresses the conjuncture of complexity thinking with 
programming and impact assessment in a development context.  Complexity 
thinking has been of increasing interest to development practitioners in 
the last few years. However, there is as yet little in the way of commonly-
accepted approaches in which it is applied practically.  The arena of impact 
assessment currently attracts hot debate about approaches and methods. 
Bringing programming and impact assessment together to investigate 
their implications for FSD’s work is an innovative step; with no pre-existing 
methodologies to apply, the work is exploratory.  Indeed it was first important 
to consider whether complexity thinking was in fact relevant to FSD before 
turning our attention to methods and frameworks. Our intention was to draw 
out key features of complexity thinking which are of value to programming 
and impact assessment and propose ways forward - a “complexity-informed” 
approach.  
The report proceeds as follows:  section two gives an overview of complexity 
theory as a world-view and explains the questions this raises for this research. 
There follows a discussion of methodological considerations with complexity 
in mind.
The third section describes the case studies and demonstrates in what ways 
they accord with complexity thinking and how they inform good practice 
in complex contexts.  The fourth section then considers the implications 
of complexity thinking for operations, focusing on evaluation and impact 
assessment in some depth. The fifth section, taking this into account, concludes 
with a proposal for how FSD can improve its monitoring and evaluation work 
in complex contexts.   
The report provides the reader with the core argument. The Annexes offer more 
detailed background on the state of the debate on impact assessment and 
its relation to complexity theory. They also give greater detail on background 
work for one of the case studies and more detail on the proposed approaches. 
1 FSD Kenya Strategy 2011-2015.
2 Foresighting is a recognised strategic technique that supports judgements about future markets and 
their determining factors. See Clayton, A., W. Wehrmeyer, et al. (2003). Foresighting for Development, 
London: Earthscan Publications.
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2.1  COMPLEXITY THEORY: PRIMARILY A WORLD-VIEW
Complexity theory provides a world-view, derived from the science of open 
systems and of non-linear interactions between elements at the micro-level. 
It describes and articulates the characteristics of a world that is interdependent 
and shaped by history and context, a world that is dynamic and subject to 
rapid shifts and the associated emergence of new features. It provides a 
fundamental, scientifically-informed ‘ontology’, that is to say, a description of 
the way the world is - a perspective on ‘being’. It also considers the processes 
of interaction and change – a perspective on ‘becoming’.
Complexity theory provides explanations of the way in which patterns and 
order can emerge. It brings together the physical sciences and the theory of 
evolution. Non-linear systems thinking in its various forms (von Bertalanffy, 
1969) points to the essential interconnectedness of the social and natural world. 
It emphasises that few outcomes have single causes and few interventions 
or events have single outcomes. More than that, interconnections cannot in 
general be treated as independent of each other, as summative. Many events 
and underlying embedded cultural and economic ‘norms’ work in synergy with 
each other; that is to say that their impact is more than – or less than - the 
sum of what their impacts would have been if each factor had operated in 
isolation.
Complexity theory, however, goes beyond systems thinking, which tends in the 
main to focus on situations, contexts and interventions as if they were stable 
(P. Allen & Boulton, 2011). Systems methods in general provide a description 
of the present; complexity theory in addition pays attention to the dynamic 
and evolutionary nature of the context, and the way new features can emerge. 
Many factors can contribute to the emergence of new features: specific events, 
local variations, shifting environmental factors, and reflexively-developing 
intentions and strategies. Complexity can be considered as a dynamic 
perspective on the way institutions are created and modifying or destroyed by 
events and the particularities of people, decisions and chance variations.
Figure 1:  interactions in a complex world 
Chapter 2
COMPLEXITY THEORY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO 
FSD
As illustrated by the diagram above, complexity theory emphasises the 
interplay between currently- instituted patterns of relationships and 
events. Patterns exist at differing, although interdependent levels in society 
and combine social, political, economic and cultural aspects. There are also 
the instituted patterns within organisations. Events and variations which 
destabilise such patterns can include the arrival of a new local leaders, a 
successful business idea emerging from a local entrepreneur, war, drought, 
new technology, and influences from the media. This idea of the dynamic 
relationship between patterns and events, between ‘science and history’ (P. M. 
Allen, 1997) as it is sometimes described, is central to complexity thinking 
and changes the way we think about the way things are and the way they 
come to be.
Complexity thinking stands in contrast to the idea of the ‘world as a machine’ 
which is the world-view (ontology) underpinning many conventional theories 
of change, strategy development and evaluation. The idea of the world as 
predictable and measurable, where causal chains can be identified and form 
the basis of plans and evaluations, is based on the mechanical science of closed 
systems with linear forces the relevance of which is brought into question in 
complex, uncertain, interconnected and fast-changing contexts such as those 
familiar to FSD. 








The complex world is:
  Systemic and synergistic
 ¶ It cannot in general be treated as a machine, deconstructed into 
separate parts connected by independent linear forces
 ¶ Non-linear interactions lead both to synergistic and antagonistic 
interactions
   Shaped by history; path dependent
 ¶  History matters; the past shapes the present and the sequence 
of events – the path - is significant to what happens next
   Sensitive to context
 ¶ The particularity of contextual factors and the  particular detail 
of events materially impacts outcomes and cannot be ignored
   Episodic
 ¶  Change is episodic not smooth or incremental. There are periods 
of apparent stasis and times (tipping points) where radical 
change occurs 
   Emergent
 ¶ New features can emerge at tipping points (and others 
disappear) and such qualitative change cannot be predicted
 ¶  ‘Things’ are dynamic, not static and the future cannot be 
known in advance; there can be unintended outcomes and 
unexpected shifts and events
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Box 1 summarises the features of a complexity world-view. The underlying 
precept is that interactions cannot be treated as linear and that linearity is a 
special case seen only in stable situations where there is little potential for 
change. Non-linear interactions at the micro-level are what lead to the features 
of a complex world – to synergies and to the inability to treat interactions 
and effects as if they were independent of each other. Non-linear interactions 
lead to episodic change and to the growth or decline of currently-established 
patterns at the meso- and macro-level. 
Episodic change means that change advances through periods where there 
is little to show, but where interactions and factors may slowly be changing 
Then there are times, so-called ‘tipping points’, when change can be rapid 
and radical. In periods of seeming stasis, it can be important to persist in 
moving towards goals and intentions, to ‘build the ground’ towards change 
even when there is little evidence of change. Equally, it is important to react 
effectively to the opportunities and threats at critical junctures (points which 
seem to have the potential for ‘tipping’). This is where change can be radical 
and new features and indeed eras can emerge. In other words, it is easy to 
give preference to the importance of tipping points3 in reviewing change and 
downplay the less-obvious role of persistence at times where there seems to 
be little evidence that anything is happening.
These features of a complex world mean that, in order to understand how 
things happen it is necessary to try to follow the path, the time-sequence 
of events, and to assume that this sequence is unique to the circumstances. 
It is only by tracing this unique path that it is possible both to understand 
why something had impact and, indeed, to have confidence that it did indeed 
contribute to impact. This thinking underpins our approach to retrospective 
impact assessment with complexity in mind in which we develop a method 
akin to process tracing, as will be discussed below.
Furthermore, in looking forwards, complexity thinking emphasises that 
change happens because stable balances between factors are disturbed so 
that effects not seemingly important start to grow and develop. The classic 
example of this thinking is the ecological balance that existed during the time 
of the dinosaurs. Small mammals seemed insignificant to the ecology, hardly 
Box 2 : An example: pro-poor financial market development in Kenya – identifying and understanding a “tipping point” 
In the mid-2000s there was a qualitative change in the banking sector’s 
understanding of its market.  Whereas bankers had previously been 
seeking to compete over those people they thought bankable, they now 
recognised that there was a huge market of unbanked people whom they 
could seek to serve.  
A tipping point is a point at which new patterns emerge, where previous 
patterns are broken and new patterns come into place.  At least two factors 
are identifiable as having contributed to this change.  First, Equity Bank 
changed its fee-charging approach away from monthly ledger fees to 
charging per transaction This was mainly based on withdrawals, while 
also allowing zero minimum balances.  This was a key moment in making 
ordinary bank accounts affordable to the majority and it attracted many 
more customers as a result.  It demonstrated to the rest of the banking 
sector that there was a large market out there which it had not to date 
considered bankable.  Second, the publication of the FinAccess survey 
results in 2006 also made an impact on the banks’ understanding of their 
market.  The survey revealed that only some 22% of adults had a bank 
account, leaving a potentially huge market to play for.
However, to arrive at such a tipping point it is necessary to explore the other 
causes and conditions that contributed to it.  What ‘built the ground’? How 
did factors converge in ways that produced synergies? Equity had been 
 
developing its business model and undertaking a lot of product innovation 
and development, taking the feedback from its customers seriously. 
Support for this process was also due to FSD Kenya’s involvement via 
MicroSave. It was Equity’s identification of itself in the late 1990s with the 
idea of serving this microfinance market that propelled its vision forwards. 
But Equity’s engagement with the low-end market would not have 
happened had it not identified itself with this sector serving low-income 
and unbanked people in contrast to dominant commercial banks at the 
time. Across the globe, lessons in microfinance were also being learned 
as a result of the experiences of – those Kenyan microfinance institutions 
such as K-REP, KWFT, Faulu who were some of the early experimenters in 
lending to poor people.   
While the Kenyan microfinance sector that was embodied in a group-
based, credit-led model had seen rather limited success in terms of market 
outreach, it nevertheless contributed to the development of the conditions 
from which Equity and its approach later emerged.    
In addition, there were other factors that contributed to change. For 
example, the role of particular leaders and entrepreneurs, such as Equity’s 
James Mwangi, as well as the political economy of Kenya which also 
shifted significantly in 2002 when a new president was elected. 
Based on (Stone, Johnson, & Hayes, 2010).
3   A note on language – we define tipping point as a place where there are qualitative differences between the before and after state – new qualities have emerged. We use critical juncture to signify a point at which things 
may tip – but, depending upon actions and other factors, may not.  
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important at all. But when the asteroid crash triggered changes in the climate 
changes that led to the extinction of the dinosaurs, there was room for small 
mammals to flourish. The point is that in order to explore emerging impact 
pathways it is necessary to be sensitive to ‘weak signals’ – that is to look 
for signs of change before they become established into new patterns.  This 
underpins the approach presented here to looking prospectively at emerging 
impact pathways as is discussed below.
2.2  METHODOLOGY IN A COMPLEX WORLD 
A central goal of this research is to experiment with and develop methodologies 
which allow programming, managing, evaluating and assessing impact in a 
complex world. In section 4 we describe these in-some-cases experimental 
and developing methodologies. In this section are summarised some of the 
over-arching features that such methodologies must reflect in their design.
Limits to universality in methodology
One of the key understandings of the complex world is that situations are 
materially affected by context and by history. So complexity theory does 
not lead - and indeed cannot lead - to universally-applicable frameworks 
of implementation or analysis. Indeed any framework that claims to be 
universally-applicable should be viewed with caution. Rather, complexity 
thinking leads to the definition of certain principles and contingent guidelines 
– leads to meta- theories of change and over-arching considerations for 
evaluation and impact assessment – rather than to detailed micro-theories 
that have generic, more universal application. 
Limits to universality in criteria for success
The lack of universality has consequences for trying to establish criteria for 
success. These criteria will be determined by the particular conditions (social, 
political, organisational, institutional etc.) and are thus not easily generic. They 
also cannot capture a complete picture, especially since they will be applied at 
a point in time and new factors may emerge during the course of the project 
or programme.  Indeed something that is regarded as a ‘failure’ at a particular 
point in time may then turn into a ‘success’ at another point in time -or vice 
versa.4   
A need to trace the pathways of events and impacts and take 
note of the dimension of time
Complexity theory emphasises that the way in which change arises is 
contingent on the detailed processes, different in each case. So, in order to 
understand this heterogeneity of outcomes and results across space, time, 
social context and so on, as is often the requirement for impact studies, it is 
necessary to understand the ‘how’ as well as the ‘what’. Complexity-informed 
empirical methodologies must therefore trace the pathway, the history of how 
change arises in the particular case. 
A need to have ways to spot ‘weak signals’ and signs of emerging 
change
Complexity theory sees change as arising at the microscopic level, in the 
detailed interactions in particular circumstances. Change may then aggregate 
from these beginnings and become more sustained. However, to understand 
change and spot emerging impacts which might inform programme changes 
or decisions to monitor new features, there needs to be ways of spotting signs 
of such emerging change. 
How precisely to undertake intervention to create change or assess impact 
will in practice differ between contexts and for different types of programme. 
This exploratory research work has therefore led to suggested guidelines and 
considerations for processes to be piloted. It outlines further explorations to be 
considered and these will be described in overview in section 4 and in more 
detail in the annexes.  
4  An example in the microfinance field in Kenya is either (i) Equity Building Society whose failure and 
virtual insolvency in itself set in place the conditions under which it was necessary for it to transform 
itself; or (ii) along similar lines the withdrawal of external funding from Partnership for Productivity in 
the 1980s which resulted in the managed ASCA model evolving in Central Province and developing a 
model with outreach to over 20,000 (Mule, Johnson, Hickson, & Mwangi, 2002).  Or  the example of 
the Western financial crisis in 2008, that a booming banking sector– given time proved to be a source 
of failure for the sector as a whole – indeed part of a long history of cycles in this sector. 
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Chapter 3
THE CASE STUDIES
3.1  THE PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF THE RESEARCH
In order to trace the details of change processes consistent with the application 
of complexity principles, the research work for FSD, based on two cases studies, 
was designed to explore the history, context and pathways of the projects and 
hence to chart the sequence of events involved in implementation and the 
range of factors contributing to the way this occurred in practice. It sought 
evidence of outcomes and evidence of emerging change and impact.  The 
purpose was:
   To investigate whether the description of a complex world as defined by 
complexity theory (set out in Box 1) fitted the context and experience of 
the projects in the way implementation took place and change was (or 
was not) happening. 
   To consider how the implementation processes the projects engaged in 
actually responded to the complexity of the context (as set out in Box 
6).
   To examine what could be learned that was relevant to project design, 
evaluation and impact assessment.
The two projects chosen from FSD’s portfolio are very different in both their 
character and form and have different final impact goals of growth and poverty 
reduction. They therefore capture some of the diversity of FSD’s portfolio. 
The Credit Information Sharing project commenced in 2008 when FSD 
recognised there was a gap in the capacity of the sector to implement the 
Central Bank of Kenya's (CBK) newly-mandatory negative credit information 
sharing guidelines.  It funded a project manager based in the Kenya Banker’s 
Association to take forward implementation through a Joint Task Force.  This 
developed into a second phase from 2011 which aimed to develop a full-
file sharing system - that is complete credit records which capture positive 
information about client loan repayment as well as negative information 
about bad debts. 
The Savings Group project in which FSD has worked with CARE since 2008, aims 
to provide small-scale savings and loan services to poor people and to those 
excluded from formal financial services. It does so through training groups of 
approximately 30 people in a methodology for saving and lending.  Groups 
are trained for a year, which takes them through one cycle of saving, lending 
to each other and then undertaking an action audit through the sharing out of 
the fund, and then starting the cycle again if they so wish.   FSD’s involvement 
in the project has experimented with alternative delivery channels for the 
training in order to test ways of lowering cost and understanding the impact of 
this on the quality of group formation and sustainability.  Finding approaches 
which significantly lower the cost per member is intended to allow for scaling 
up of the dissemination of the methodology and achievement of mass 
inclusion in this basic financial service.  The second phase of the project since 
2011 is intended to lead to decisions on what approaches to adopt by the end 
of 2013. In the table below, we identify the differing characteristics of these 
projects, and in the next section, we describe the results of our research.
Credit information sharing (CIS) Savings groups
  Impact pathway expected to lead directly to lower interest rates for SME 
finance as banks information costs are lowered; they implement risk based 
pricing, and information rather than using physical collateral.  This leads to 
SME development and growth. 
   Impact pathway expected to lead to direct impacts on access to 
appropriate financial services for poor people and thereby to poverty 
reduction.  This is achieved through use of service to increase incomes and 
reduce vulnerability as a result of consumption smoothing.
  Project design much more open and responsive to proposed outcome 
which is full-file credit information sharing.
   Project design much tighter as to how the outcome – i.e. appropriate 
financial services delivered through savings groups – is to be achieved and 
testing of effectiveness via different delivery channels.
  Small ‘n’  – only one initiative    Large ‘n’ – i.e. large number of instances of the intervention at work. 
  Prior experience of implementation very limited – experience 
from other countries drawn upon via consultants but no direct experience 
in Kenya.
   Prior experience of implementation elsewhere where earlier learning 
and adaptation can be built upon.
  Evaluation and impact assessment: project completion report of phase 1 
available but project continuing – no time lapse to see what has emerged/
resulted from project over time.
  Wider impacts are also relevant (e.g. stability of financial sector due to 
fewer ‘bad debts’, increased trust between banks etc.)
   Evaluation and impact assessment: a range of studies have been 
conducted. 
   Time: a significant time has elapsed following earlier phases – so time for 
wider (and narrower) impacts to emerge and be visible.
   Wider impacts: the potential for wider impacts to occur – on the socio-
economic and financial services landscape - over and above the intended 
impact.
Table 1: Comparison of case study project characteristics 
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METHODOLOGY
The focus on the research was to develop a history of the project and of what 
led up to the project – to allow investigation of the detailed pathways that 
have unfolded. This is a version of process tracing as we will discuss later. 
In addition we asked interviewees about any evidence of change that was 
beginning to emerge so that we could identify any prospective ‘growing 
shoots’ of change, that is, evidence of new impact pathways. 
We not only looked ‘inside’ the project, we also explored the wider contextual 
and historical factors which could or have shaped and influenced the project 
design, and contribute to or constrain potential success. We explored the past 
– what was happening in the context before the project started, that is what 
earlier factors were relevant, be they cultural or due to other interventions or 
environmental or political factors. We asked questions about the wider context 
in the present – other players, changes to social, political, environmental 
and economic factors. And we looked forwards to the future – key events 
such as elections or private sector investment, other planned changes and 
interventions, future potential opportunities and threats.
The research involved primary interviews with project implementers and 
stakeholders, and review of secondary project documentation. The objective 
was to glean the key events and key determinants of the project path 
through triangulating these accounts. In some cases second interviews were 
undertaken to check information, or explore certain points in more detail or 
to discuss issues where there were differences of opinion. In the case of the 
savings groups, interviews were with groups of stakeholders as well as with 
individuals.
The research was undertaken over a total of eight days of field work in Nairobi 
and in the field.  This was not therefore intended to be a detailed impact 
assessment of either project, but was designed to investigate how change 
was occurring; how this could be better understood using the insights of 
complexity theory. An additional aim was to propose an approach for FSD as a 
programme that could better capture this complex change.    
In the following sections the experience of the projects is described.  The 
inserted boxes give a commentary on these events from the perspective of 
complexity theory.
3.2  CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING 
3.2.1  Background
The project works primarily with key stakeholders – financial institutions, 
the Central Bank, and credit bureaux, and engages with other stakeholders as 
need arises.  It is strategic in nature, with a clear long-term goal to establish a 
credit-information-sharing system which contains positive credit information 
about borrowers as well as information on bad debtors as initially mandated. 
Since it is obviously a unique, one-off project in Kenya it has to manage its 
way forward, responding to the emerging needs that implementing an 
information-sharing system virtually from scratch in the local context has 
required.  It has had to manoeuvre to address the challenges this raises, while 
at the same time seeking to move opinion towards the benefits of sharing 
positive as well as negative information. 
3.2.2  The story of the project and its back-history 
FSD started its first phase of involvement in 2008 to bridge a gap in the 
implementation of the newly- mandated negative credit information sharing 
guidelines.  FSD funded both the project manager based in the Kenya Banker’s 
Association (KBA) and related activities to take forward implementation 
including through a Joint Task Force.  This grew into a second phase project 
in 2011, intended to develop the system further and bring about full-file 
information sharing.  
In this section, the story of the development of credit information sharing in 
Kenya is summarised, taking as a starting point the issue of ‘political loans’ in 
the 1990s and ending with the passing of legislation for full-file share at the 
end of 2012. Not every feature is included; the narrative is designed to pull 
out what are seen to be key moments and key contributory factors in moving 
forwards. We provide a commentary through a ‘complexity lens’. 
The early 1990s: The banking sector had a history of lending in the 
1980s and 1990s which resulted in three phases of bank failure. This was as 
a result of the political ownership of some banks and political basis of many 
lending decisions.  For the banking sector the difficulties of managing bad 
debts and ensuring that debtors did not simply move between banks was 
of prime concern.  It was also very politically sensitive.  Banks had become 
very conservative in their lending requiring 100% collateral.   At this time a 
number of stakeholders had different objectives but common aims which 
were complementary - but MPs were pulling against this.  These stakeholders 
included:
   The CBK, which was concerned with the stability of the banking system 
due to the impact of non-performing loans on bank collapses. The bank 
saw the potential for a credit reference scheme to stimulate growth 
through supporting increased lending. 
   The KBA as an industry association was concerned to find ways to reduce 
the bad debt portfolio.  
   Credit bureaux: one bureau – Metropole (1996) - acted as an agent for 
Dunn and Bradstreet, developing credit reports on Kenyan companies 
wanting to trade abroad.  Another bureau – Credit Reference Kenya – 
started operating in the early 1990s as a debt collector for banks.  
   The IFC, which had been working for some time supporting the 
development of CRBs in developing countries and were active in Kenya. 
 IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPLEXITY THEORY•  7
The regulations then had to be written and a Joint Task Force (JTF) organised 
with IFC playing a key part with KBA and CBK was formed in November 2007 
– but little progress was made.  
Arrival of FSD in late 2008. At a three-day workshop focused on 
implementation it was clear that more focus and resources were needed.  FSD 
offered to fund/help. Their motivation was distinct from others’ in that their 
focus was the potential to increase lending to SMEs. 
FSD’s offer to support implementation was accepted as the key IFC person 
was also withdrawing at that time, and because stakeholders saw how much 
there was still to implement. Also FSD was known and trusted.  However, the 
initial recruitment of a project manager from the private sector failed and FSD 
approached the current PM who had been working at the CBK on this issue 
and had involved FSD in the workshop.
The Project Manager (PM) started work in August 2009 seeking to 
regenerate momentum. Although the banks were supposed to be compliant 
with the guidelines by February 2009, this had not been achieved.  His prior 
connections to stakeholders in CBK and KBA helped generate influence and 
move things forward. Together with his reflective and anticipatory approach, 
he was well-placed to keep attention on the longer-term goal of sharing 
positive information, to anticipate what was required and to plan ahead.
The project had three pillars: communication, specifying protocol 
for data-sharing and sorting out legal implications.  The idea of having a 
champion in each bank was used to provide focal points and move things 
forward.  However, there was a strong negative public perception that this was 
a ‘black-list’ which was 
not helped by the way the 
press reported.  Initially 
while the law mandated sharing of information it did not require that banks 
used it so few banks were buying credit reports.  The first CRB was licensed in 
February 2010.
These motivations all pulled together synergistically but MPs were resisting 
the issue.  They were concerned that the finger would be pointed at them if 
their bad debts and their bouncing of cheques presented during high profile 
harambees (fundraising events) came to light.
Slowly creeping forwards 1992-2006: in 1998 four banks collapsed. 
This gave the impetus for CBK to establish a credit reference process for very 
bad debts which was allowed by common law. By 2000, six banks were taking 
part.  The debate developed as to how to establish a more fully-established 
credit reference system.  The CBK did not wish to host it, and the banks wanted 
CBK to license a CRB.  However the non-performing debt crisis eased off in the 
late 1990s so the heat was off for establishing a CRB.  IFC suggested to the two 
credit reference bureaux, CRB Africa and Metropole, that they should establish 
a CRB association to use as a lobby group. They approached KBA around 2002 
to push for the sharing of information.  
In 2004 the Banking Act was amended to allow sharing of negative 
information, but did not make it mandatory.  By 2006 Barclays in particular 
was making some unsecured loans as a result of informal information sharing. 
A key decision by parliament was made in 2007 for mandatory 
sharing of negative information.  One of our informants reported that 
in May 2007, the Leader of the Finance Committee of Parliament asked for 
a meeting with him as MD of Metropole to have him explain why sharing 
of negative information was so 
important – its relation to controlling 
interest rates and impact on poverty 
if loans are less driven by collateral. He also wanted to know that it was not 
aimed at embarrassing MPs.  This contributed to the passing of the bill. 
These motivations pulled together synergistically, apart from 
MPs who were resistant
A tipping point
This was a systematic approach
The history of ‘political lending’ and the political and cultural 
importance of harambees meant that MPs were resistant to credit 
references in case they were discredited.
This was a critical juncture – a point where there was a sense 
of frustration that things were not moving forwards – FSD seized 
this opportunity. There were several reasons, coming together, 
why FSD was selected and why the time was right. 
The choice of PM was critical due to his forward-looking 
skills, his persistence towards the goal, his ability both to seize 
opportunities to influence and plan critical moments ahead (e.g. 
conference) and his networks.
The impetus for a credit reference scheme waxed and waned in 
relation to the level of bad debts – path dependency 
There was persistence towards the goal, driven in part by 
the motivations and lobbying of the credit bureaux – and a final 
breakthrough in 2004
8  • IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPLEXITY THEORY
A pilot exercise in reporting to the CRB in Spring 2010, was 
‘particularly depressing’ in the eyes of FSD. Large numbers of records were 
rejected by the CRB and banks 
were still nervous about sharing 
the information.  The PM ‘played 
the regulator card’ and emphasised 
sharing was mandatory.  
The second CRB, Metropole, was licensed in April 2011.
A planned-for, carefully-considered key event: East African 
Regional Conference July 2011.  The project brought World Bank 
and Bank for International Settlements experts and others from all over the 
world, along with key stakeholders in Kenya and the rest of the region. This 
showcased Kenya’s progress but was also used to show the importance of 
sharing positive information as internationally-recognised best practice. 
The event built support for this through sharing examples of how this had 
been effective in other countries.  This was widely reported as a really critical 
moment – perhaps the most important turning point – by all interviewees. 
It launched the national task force and discussions on how to design the next 
phase of the project.  
A critical moment came in July 2012 with the mandatory 
sharing of full-file information.  The CBK was keen to head off the 
threat of an interest rate cap that was being discussed by Parliament - a 
recurring issue given that interest rate spreads had remained high.  The CBK 
met with MPs and one in particular was interested to understand how full-file 
sharing would contribute to lower spreads by reducing costs for the banks. 
The amendment was passed the same evening although the MP had seized 
the opportunity to have it included in the Central Bank Act rather than the 
Banking Act.  
This leapfrogged an initiative of the JTF to bring the largest banks together 
to develop a code of conduct for voluntarily sharing full-file information.  The 
legal amendments had also been made for MFIs to share negative information 
but not positive. Together, these developments mean that there is a lot of 
work to be done in harmonising the legal framework and interpreting the 
regulations appropriately and in building the cooperation between the banks 
required to make full-file really effective.
Another example of 
adapting in light of a negative 
response.
This was seen by many as a very important critical juncture 
for the project – which was anticipated, designed and worked 
towards on many fronts – seizing opportunities and working 
intentionally.
This was a curious critical juncture.  It came almost too soon 
and cut across the gradual building towards this point that had 
been happening.  It had to be adapted to. 
The project had to adapt to this negative issue of black-listing 
and endeavour to establish a campaign of influencing and turning 
this negative publicity to its advantage.
3.2.3  Was the context complex?
This history and background to the project demonstrates a number of features 
of complexity theory. We follow the structure given in Box 1.
First, a number of factors came together systemically to create the conditions 
for the move towards a credit sharing scheme.  Differing stakeholders wanted 
credit information sharing for differing reasons, but these reasons did not pull 
against each other. The Central Bank wanted to ensure the stability of the 
banking system; the banks wanted to improve the quality of their lending, 
and the credit bureaux were driven in part by the potential for extending 
their operations.  Stakeholders such as FSD wanted to improve the potential 
for SMEs to get credit at lower interest rates through information rather than 
physical collateral; and politicians – who held out for some time – eventually 
saw this as a way to address the need for lower interest rates.  
Second, the history and context and sequence of events were important. 
The banking crisis in the early 1990s led to an interest in credit referencing. 
Then in the late 1990s, the heat went off, slowing things down. The particular 
issue of political loans being used to ‘lock in’ political support together with 
the importance of harambees meant that politicians were not entirely 
positive about credit sharing. How and when credit sharing was agreed and 
implemented was therefore constrained by the particular history and culture 
of Kenya.  Another country would have had a different sequence of events and 
different conditions to address and different moments to seize when conditions 
became favourable to take action. The story of particular relationships – part 
of the specificity of the context – was also important: how influences for 
change and involvement of particular people (such as FSD’s involvement and 
the subsequent selection of the project manager) came through particular 
conversations held at particular times or through particular events.
Third, the history demonstrates the episodic nature of change: the way 
change in attitudes often happened imperceptibly over several years and 
then key events (which had been built towards by many stakeholders over 
extended periods of time) moved forwards suddenly – with the 2004 bill, the 
2008 bill, and the sudden agreement of positive sharing. There were a number 
of critical junctures in the story – some, where there was a strong sense 
that, if these moments were seized, the project could make leaps forwards. 
Some of these were constructed and planned for (such as the international 
conference); others came as a result of influencing and slow change, but came 
unexpectedly – for example the final legislation for sharing full-file. 
Finally, the history shows how, after a critical juncture, new features can 
emerge. For example, credit reference reports have now come to be used in 
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the selection of people for public office – this is a new emergent feature which 
was neither expected nor intended.
3.2.4  Did the project design and project team respond to  
 the complexity of the situation?
The project team, and indeed the wider stakeholder group demonstrated in 
many ways, both in their actions and in the way they related the history of 
the project in interviews, that they were attuned to the complex nature of the 
context. 
We set out the behaviours required to deal with complexity in Box 6 in 
section 4. The episodic and emergent nature of change requires adaptation 
and the ability to seize opportunities and respond to unexpected events and 
consequences. Equally, there is a need to set long-term goals and aspirations 
and persist in moving towards them – otherwise implementation becomes 
blown by the wind – adaptive and responsive yet unfocused and non-
strategic.
First, the team was very clear about the ultimate goal to which it aspired of 
achieving full- file information sharing and persisted in this goal, operating 
purposefully to “build the ground” to this end even while they were still in the 
midst of getting the negative information sharing system operational.  
The Regional Conference in particular was a strategic and anticipatory and 
very important bid to put this goal before the sector and engage with it.  This 
was a planned and intentional way to try to create a ‘tipping point’ and was 
deemed to be successful in this respect; interviewees reported that this was 
the point at which the wider stakeholder group really started to believe that 
full-file sharing was both desirable and possible. The conference created 
significant legitimacy for this goal while also putting pressure towards the 
effective implementation of the negative system and creating the space for 
a new, wider stakeholder group that could take this goal beyond the banks 
alone into the other financial institutions and credit providers.  
The team also demonstrated how it could adapt to the fact that the 
legislation for full-file sharing came somewhat unexpectedly and cut across 
the development of a platform for voluntary implementation which was 
almost in place when the mandating of full-file was agreed by parliament. 
This in turn has created new challenges to be managed as the legislation is 
somewhat piecemeal and not at all comprehensive.  
The project, being one of a kind, is entirely customised to the particularities of 
the Kenyan context while drawing on learning and expertise from elsewhere.
3.2.5 What the case study demonstrated about impact
In particular in the second round of interviews, we were keen to explore what 
impact the interviewees felt that the project had achieved or was achieving 
5 The PM also indicated a concern that loans may be being paid by resorting to borrowing from the 
informal sector and that this might be an issue to monitor.  This is a useful example from a complexity 
perspective.  It highlights an unexpected impact pathway that could be set off by the system.  An 
appropriate approach would be to bear this in mind and note down any anecdotal evidence to suggest 
that it might in fact be happening, and then if this started to appear to be important enough, set about 
ways to monitor it more systematically.  
and what impact information was being collected and could be collected. We 
were also interested to see – methodologically - how effective the interview 
processes were in gleaning information about emerging impact.
As is apparent, the negative information sharing is in the very early stages 
of operational use and the banks are only now learning to operate both to 
supply and use the information on bad debtors.  To date, this information has 
been used by some banks as a means to encourage people to repay their loans 
since debtors are informed that their case will be reported if they do not pay. 
It is also used to screen if people have outstanding debts in other banks – in 
which case they will not be granted a loan.  It is also used by some banks at the 
appraisal stage of loans to back up decisions.  However, the very basic way the 
information is being used to date has demonstrated the lack of capacity within 
the banks to use the more detailed information that will be available in full file 
reports to deliver risk-based pricing. 
There is some indication that the system has improved loan repayment 
performance although bad debts were in fact rising in early 2013 as a result of 
other economic factors. This in turn demonstrates the difficulties of assessing 
impact in this area by focussing solely on the prevalence of bad debts5 and 
interest rates.  However, it demonstrates that the detailed processes through 
which these changes have the potential to affect interest rates need to be 
carefully traced if the impact of its contribution is to be appropriately assessed 
in future.  
At present monitoring is at the level of use of the system: for example, the 
number of reports being requested from the credit bureaux. Establishing 
impact requires working along the impact pathway through the bank’s 
systems to see how these are being used/not used.  It also establishes how 
they are affecting (or not) the ways in which both repayment enforcement 
and lending decisions are being made, along with monitoring the numbers of 
loans involved and to whom they are being made. 
An unexpected use of credit reports has been their use in screening applicants 
for political and public office, which has arisen as a result of the integrity clause 
in the new Constitution.  This has also been adopted for new directors by the 
banks themselves, and appears to be making its way into other parts of the 
private sector.  This is an unexpected impact in terms of timing which also has 
positive feedback effects on the public credibility of the CIS system. 
In terms of evaluating the research process, asking these questions about 
impact during the interviews was useful in several ways: it brought attention 
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Over time, other adaptations were made. As demand grew (and Rusinga 
Island now demanded their own savings groups), the project team started to 
involve local trainers who were not paid but were given bicycles to help them 
travel to the groups (and which they were also allowed to keep). The training 
manual was adapted for their use.
There was tension between the institutional view (within CARE and within the 
wider academic community) that there is a ‘right’ way to implement savings 
groups (based on methods developed in Zimbabwe) and the need as felt by 
the project team to customise the approach for the communities they were 
working in. This tension was so strong that at one point the project was nearly 
cancelled as it was felt the project team was ‘doing it wrong’. The situation 
was only resolved with the intervention of an expert in savings groups (Hugh 
Allen) who visited the project and validated their approach (he said it was the 
most innovative he had come across).
The story highlights the importance of persistence – both within the 
communities which had to find a savings schedule that worked for the fishing 
communities), and within CARE, which had to battle with the feeling that the 
project was not implementing savings groups in the ‘right way’.
Involvement of FSD
The CARE PM saw an advertisement for a call for proposals from FSD to 
which she responded.   Discussion with FSD took over a year to arrive at a 
final proposal.  FSD’s interests were to find a cost-effective methodology to 
scaling up SG implementation.  This in turn involved innovative thinking which 
applied elements of thinking about markets. It considered which actors might 
be available to implement including private sector businesses; and methods of 
structuring incentives that would support effective delivery.
Building on her prior experience, the PM was challenged to produce an 
approach to scale-up where different delivery channels could be compared 
(local trainers managed by franchisees or faith-based organisations and direct 
support from CARE).
to what information is known (requests for reports), what is emerging and 
could be monitored (increase in loans to SMEs, increase in informal loans). 
It also showed what requires a forward-looking process tracing approach to 
monitor and see if there are any indications of contribution (project events 
correlated with interest rate movements). 
3.3  SAVINGS GROUPS
3.3.1  Background
The first phase of FSD’s support to CARE’s Savings Group project ran from 
2008 to 2011 and reached 125,000 people in 4,500 groups.  Beyond direct 
implementation, the goal of the project was to test different delivery channels 
for training groups in the methodology in order to lower the costs of delivery 
and establish effective approaches for a national scale up.  The project is now 
in a further phase which is further testing delivery systems and consolidating 
learning (including moving to a more challenging area such as Marsabit). It 
had reached a further 80,000 people in some 3,000 groups by mid–2012.     
3.3.2  History of the project
The history of the way in which CARE staff started implementing SGs in 
Western Kenya in the early 2000s is akin to the story of many types of initiatives 
which take an idea, try it out seek to adapt it and assess what will work in the 
local context.   CARE had worked with mainstream microfinance models with 
little success and since it was also operating with programmes in agriculture 
and health, the organisation wanted to find an approach to financial inclusion 
that could work with poor and rural communities. 
CARE started working with savings groups in Kenya in 2003, funded by USAID. 
The idea of savings groups was new to Kenya but had been implemented by 
CARE in Zimbabwe. CARE started implementing in Rusinga Island, but field 
staff were ‘laughed at’ by the local communities who were already receiving a 
lot of aid of various kinds. They mocked the idea that saving their own money 
could be of benefit. 
The CARE team moved on to another area, Suba. Although there was less 
current development work in Suba, this was a region in which SACCOs had 
collapsed and people had lost a lot of money. So, in the fishing communities 
targeted, there was little trust and a real concern that any money would be 
lost. The CARE team gained their trust by reducing the savings collection 
interval from one month (as set out in the Zimbabwean manual) to one week 
and finally to one day.
This response was path-dependent, emanated from the ‘aid 
culture’ that had been established
The team adapted to the difficulties in Rusinga Island, by 
moving elsewhere and then had to customise the approach to 
deal with the (path-dependent) results of SACCO collapse
The team experimented with implementation and adapted 
and customised the approach to training
This tension highlights the difference in mind-set between 
adopting a machine view (right way, minimum experimentation 
and customisation) and an approach congruent with complexity 
(adaptation, customisation, experimentation)
The persistence of the project team to implement the process 
in ways they felt it would work – taking on CARE management 
at times.
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While the initiation of the project therefore took considerable time, FSD offered 
a focus on experimentation but with a clearer research focus so that learning 
could be identified. This evidence-based approach to experimentation has 
been important for the project and is deemed to have created a research-
based approach within the CARE team. This careful approach to considerations 
of scale-up and efficacy has supported the growth of savings groups and 
helped those involved to learn which methods are most effective. 
It is also important to recognise that NGO approaches have changed 
considerably over the last decade to more sustainable models (microfinance 
is itself an example) and that the appetite for them also develops as part of 
this wider system of change.  FSD’s engagement with CARE’s SG programme 
took this in a new direction because it sought to find delivery mechanisms 
that reduced the cost of delivery sufficiently that a scaled-up programme 
would create a self-sustaining methodology.  This could operate at the level 
of providers (i.e. a network of sustainable fee-for-service providers), or at 
the level of users with a sufficient understanding of how groups operate 
accountably and transparently that spreads through peer-to-peer learning. 
Indeed this latter approach would necessarily suggest a non-linear impact 
pathway with the expectation that network effects will produce a ‘tipping 
point’ into an irreversible shift in understanding and the sustainability of user-
owned groups. How to keep the process alive, adaptive and learning during 
scale-up is an important issue to keep in mind.
3.3.3  Was the context complex?
In the story of the history of the project, there were many examples of how the 
history and context were relevant and shaped the situation ‘on the ground’ 
– e.g. move from Rusinga, impact of previous collapse of SACCOS in Suba.
There were also historical factors with CARE itself that had shaped 
the expectations and views of ‘best’ practice. Savings groups had been 
implemented in Zimbabwe and there was a lot of pressure to adopt the design 
that had been perfected there. Customisation was frowned upon and the 
Kenya project was nearly stopped as the project team were initially regarded 
as not implementing the process correctly.  
As we engaged with the focus groups of stakeholders, there were also many 
indications of emerging impacts, that had not been intended or planned 
for but seemed, in the eyes of several of the stakeholder groups, to be starting 
There would seem to be a congruence between FSD’s focus on 
comparing pilots and CARE’s view of the need to customise and 
experiment.
FSD brings a more careful, research-based approach to 
experimentation which has changed CARE’s more ad-hoc 
approach
6 For example, savings groups were starting to form clusters; there were examples of new enterprises 
e.g. bee keeping or pickling of vegetables and a growing interest in establishing cooperatives; more 
men were joining the groups and starting to shape their agendas.
7 In that, for example, if cooperatives were formed and failed, the savings groups would fail too.
8 And indeed had to adapt again when, later, these communities demanded that savings groups were 
set up when they found out how successful they were elsewhere.
9 And later customised it again when working in Marsabit.
10 E.g. considering how to support clusters, linking with work on marketing and providing financial 
management training, talking to banks about providing products that would support savings groups.
to emerge.6 And these emerging impacts could, in the future have an impact 
on the core impact of creating financial inclusion for the poor.7  This issue of 
emerging impacts is discussed in the next section.
3.3.4  Did the project design and project team respond to the  
complexity of the situation?
As with the credit reference project, there was a lot of evidence that the 
project design and the project team were responsive to the complexities 
of the context. For example, the project team adapted to the resistance 
of the Rusinga Island communities8  and experimented with the use of 
community-based trainers. They also customised the approach from that 
developed in Zimbabwe to suit particular contexts.9  There was some evidence 
that the project was anticipating the future in the sense of spotting 
emergent changes and developing a response10. 
3.3.5  Reviewing impact 
The process of exploring the impact of the savings groups work proceeded 
in a similar way to that for the credit reference project through interviewing 
stakeholders. However, given its scale and nature there have already been a 
number of studies examining its impact and dynamics.  This section therefore 
involves two parts.  First, we review the secondary material for the insights 
this gives into the complex world in which SGs are operating and hence the 
way in which impact is related to these features of complexity.  Second, we 
show how interviews with stakeholders in the field demonstrate how impact 
pathways which are both planned and emerging need to be explored in 
impact work.  This discussion feeds into the methodological proposals made 
in the following section.  
3.3.5.1  Secondary sources
There are now a number of studies of SG operations and performance in 
Kenya (both of CARE’s work and of the programme by CRS at the Coast) and 
a more limited amount of data that examines the impact on individuals. 
However, a key limitation of reviewing material from secondary sources from 
a complexity perspective is the lack of a time dimension.  The material involves 
cross-sectional studies as is usual for this type of work, rather than charting 
how change has happened for particular SGs in particular contexts with their 
particular histories and path-dependencies. This material therefore allows 
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us to highlight the diversity of contexts in which SGs are working and the 
implications of these studies from a complexity perspective.  
The reports demonstrate that there is “enormous institutional diversity” (DAI, 
2010, p34) in SG operations and performance.  The causes of this diversity are 
indicative but systematic influences are not clear.  Local experience of group-
based interventions - especially of financial groups in the form of merry-go-
rounds, table-banking etc. – influences take-up and performance since many 
groups were formed out of prior existing groups.  Indeed, self-help ideologies 
have a deep history in both colonial and independent government policy.  This 
path-dependency operates collectively in relation to groups as it affects the 
character and knowledge of groups in the community as a whole. It also works 
more specifically at the level of the trajectories of individual groups.   Reports 
show that groups also sought connections with other NGO programmes rather 
than striving for the autonomy that the SG model tends to assume is the 
objective (M. L. Odell & Rippey, 2011).  In this they were themselves looking 
for synergies. 
In these studies, there is evidence that context does appear to contribute 
to differences in performance.  These particularly emerge across geographic 
locations with evidence suggesting that some of the strongest SGs are in 
Rachuonyo District.  The characteristics that contribute to this are not well 
understood. They may come from a range of causes in the local context and 
the way the programme has interacted with it (e.g Through staffing, project 
relationships, and the way intervention modalities fit into this and so on). 
In these ways the performance and sustainability of groups themselves 
is a product of the local context and histories of past policy. It may also be 
contributed to by the way that the intervention relates to other projects and 
local events which may operate with positive synergies in some places and 
negatively in others (e.g. Where people have experience of failure).  
The research shows that - for individuals - the way small scale savings and 
loans offer opportunities varies depending on local economic contexts.  For 
example, in tea growing areas research suggests that the SG savings and loan 
repayments synergised somewhat negatively with tea production because it 
precipitated the sale of tea by women through the free market (soko huru) 
system.  This brought lower returns than sales through the KTDA marketing 
system in which men were more likely to be registered (Coady Institute, 
2012).  In coffee growing areas access to SG finance supported engagement 
with more diversified sets of livelihood activities.  SGs can therefore enable 
consumption smoothing both directly through access to finance for particular 
needs, or indirectly through the way they support cash flow in a range of 
livelihood activities.  Women appreciate the increased autonomy that access to 
these funds offers while men appreciate women’s contributions to household 
expenditure.  SGs in some contexts fit into ideologies of “busy women” (Elliott, 
2012) whose commitment to development is expressed through group 
membership. They also offer opportunities to demonstrate leadership and 
engage with local authority structures.  
Synergies are also evident in the way that SGs fit with the assets, skills and 
social networks of the middle poor and particularly for women who are more 
able to use and benefit from them than men or poorer people (DAI, 2010). 
SGs can then also be synergistic in both positive and negative ways with 
other services.  They provide competition with other MFIs and even banks on 
the one hand, while providing attractive ready-made groups with which some 
formal institutions now wish to link.  
This brief overview of the evidence (a more detailed review is available in 
Annex 3) suggests that the variety of performance results from a wide range of 
underlying conditions. Indeed, at this analytical level, it is not at all clear which 
of these factors is most important in determining performance.  In addition 
there are a range of factors which are not investigated in the studies, that could 
be hypothesised as affecting the dynamics and hence performance of groups; 
these include the influence of the skills and leadership abilities of trainers 
themselves; the role of group leadership; the role of group composition (e.g. 
Extent of relatedness within groups) and so on.  
From the viewpoint of complexity this demonstrates well the way in which 
an intervention interacts with an open-system which has context, history and 
path dependency. It shows how the ability of the SG to function well is the 
product of these very micro-level factors in a way that potentially brooks clear 
generalisation.11 In addition, this review demonstrates the methodological 
point that cross-sectional studies may well fail to reveal the synergies of 
context, history and path-dependency. It shows how these interact with the 
conditions on the ground that can result in a tipping point for a particular 
group into self-sustaining strong group performance or lead to failure. It is 
interesting to ask whether, if the studies had been designed more explicitly 
to investigate and uncover ‘complexity’, and had paid more attention to the 
pathways of development over time, such studies could have been more 
helpful in identifying specific trajectories of change experienced by different 
groups.
3.3.5.2  Tracing impact pathways
In the field we interviewed groups of stakeholders - SG members, village 
chiefs, government development officers and CARE project staff - in order 
to get their views of the developmental trajectory of the SGs. One difference 
from the work with CIS was that in these interviews there was much more 
discussion pointing to impact pathways.  It was possible to gain a qualitative 
view of the importance of emerging pathways through keeping a tab on the 
number of times certain themes were raised.  The impact pathways reported 
below resulted from an analysis of the interview material. They enable some 
reflection on the impact pathways planned for and anticipated by the project, 
11 This conclusion is also consistent with much other research on user-owned group dynamics, see e.g. 
(Bouman, 1995; Johnson & Sharma, 2007).
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Impact pathway Evidence from interviews Questions arising
A: Anticipated impact pathways
1. Financial inclusion  
(Direct impact)
SGs have become established as a stable 
part of the social and financial landscape.
   Are savings groups growing and sustaining?  Are they replicating spontaneously? 
   Is the methodology working well (e.g. methods of paying and supporting CBTs)? 
   Is it scaling up cost-effectively?
   Is the model going off track in any way or innovating positively?
2. Impact on incomes; 
wealth;  vulnerability and 
consumption smoothing.
(Final impact)
Respondents report a wide range of uses 
for the funds they get from SGs ranging 
from household expenses to school fees, 
small businesses and trading, furniture 
and livestock purchase. 
   Are people better able to weather shocks in terms of food consumption, keeping 
children in school etc.? 
   Are they more able to buy food, clothes and medicines for themselves? 
   Is there greater accumulation of assets such as furniture, livestock, housing etc.?
3. Economic growth (implied in 
main impact pathway – but 
can be specifically monitored.)
Some evidence of increased economic 
activity; more people undertaking small 
scale businesses. 
   Are people able to increase their incomes from current business and livelihood 
activities or are these saturated and producing low returns?  
4. Economic development  
(could be implied by main 
impact pathway – can be 
specifically monitored.) 
There was some evidence of new types 
of enterprises being taken up.  Some of 
these were being undertaken in groups. 
   Is there evidence of new enterprises e.g. making honey, pickling vegetables?
   Is there evidence of access to new markets? 
   Are these new enterprises individual or collective?
B: Unanticipated / emerging impact pathways 
5. Social impact
Evidence that SGs offer social solidarity 
and support, especially to women. 
   Are SGs developing solidarity and trust between people? 
   How are they affecting relationships between men and women?
6. Collective action among 
savings groups.
There was concern in groups about how 
to handle increasing amounts of cash. 
Some groups were clustering together 
and their aspirations were expressed 
by members and local leaders to form 
SACCOs. 
   What is happening as groups handle more money, cluster together, have 
aspirations to be even larger? 
   How are they tackling governance and accountability?
   How do they deal with bad debts? 
   Is there a change in leadership (from women to men) – what are the longer 
term implications of this?
7. Financial market 
development
Many respondents indicated a preference 
for SGs over MFIs and banks.  Banks are 
interested in linking to groups and CARE 
was working with a bank to develop 
special accounts. (See Box 3 below). 
   How are savings groups changing the financial landscape (e.g. impact on MFIs, 
behaviour of banks (e.g. set up local branches, offer interest-bearing current 
accounts)? 
8. Financial capabilities
Respondents reported that SGs are 
supporting a culture of saving.
   How is the financial behaviour of savings group members changing e.g. are they 
maturing into use of other financial practices?
   Is financial literacy increasing?
9. SGs as potentially influential 
local institutions
There were reports of how SGs were on 
the radar of government, business and 
politicians.  
   Are savings groups being seen as a political force, or as an economic force? 
   Are they using their collective power? 
   Are they seen as powerful by the private and public sector?
10: The impact of savings 
groups on NGO approaches.
There was indication that other NGOs 
are considering the use of SGs as a core 
component in interventions. 
   Is the SG approach being used as core to other development related activities 
e.g. for disaster risk reduction programmes? Is it changing belief in creating non-
dependent aid and development?
Table 2:  Impact pathways of savings groups 
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and those that are not anticipated but about which indications were emerging. 
This material then suggests questions for follow up impact work.   
The above table highlights the many dimensions in which SGs are interacting 
with an open-system that open-ended conversations with members and 
stakeholders produce.  
 There are two main points here: first, from a complexity perspective, the way 
in which these impact pathways interact with each other may be critical for 
the core anticipated impact pathway in order to operate successfully.  The 
SG approach has stripped down the model into one which seeks to deliver 
financial inclusion alone – it has removed any linked services and (usually)12 
assumes that groups will be able to continue to operate effectively on their 
own after a year of training and support. Nevertheless there was much 
discussion about how people could in fact develop their livelihoods.  There is 
huge aspiration for groups to support economic advancement of the members 
individually and collectively.13 At the individual level, whether or not the 
local economy is supporting livelihood opportunities dynamically (economic 
growth and development) and the need for skills and assets to take advantage 
of these is of course critical to the survival of the groups themselves.  SGs are 
dependent on these dynamics even if core interventions do not wish to engage 
in promoting the development of new market opportunities and niches.14  
There was also evidence both in the existing studies and the field research that 
groups undertook collective activity of benefit to them. Moreover, groups were 
starting to cluster together in places visited – allowing them to establish, for 
example, a social fund to help those in difficulties and allow the potential to 
invest in larger enterprises. While programme staff knew this and could see 
both the potential advantages and disadvantages, the programme had left the 
area and did not have a follow up strategy to address it. 15   
The point here is that if successful, such pathways have the potential to 
support greater impact and if unsuccessful, they have the potential to severely 
undermine the core intended impact. Indeed, the risks of this are probably 
greater than the chances of success as widespread experience demonstrates. 
The danger is that the failure of those specific groups leads to more widely 
negative reputational effects (as has clearly been the case in the past).  Indeed 
SGs could be at a critical juncture after a few years in an area as the dynamic 
effects of success and failure are likely to feedback into overall higher or lower 
demand for the approach.  This could tip the demand for the methodology into 
a virtuous or vicious circle.  
The second point is methodological, that through this identification of existing 
and potentially new impact pathways, it is possible to formulate further 
questions and seek evidence to gauge their importance and their mutual 
impact.   This can be undertaken in part through reviewing secondary reports 
and also through on-going monitoring by the project team.  They were able to 
see to what extent such ‘weak signals’ of possible trends continue to emerge 
– or indeed die away. This approach therefore highlights emerging trends 
(where there are still only ‘weak signals’).  It also identifies potential synergistic 
interconnections which may either be a threat or support to the core goal to 
increase involvement in savings groups in a sustainable fashion.
The weak signals of trends obviously provoke questions which need to be 
explored further. For example:
   To what extent are groups clustering? Should there be some support 
given in formation of clusters and federations and some information 
about the pros and cons of SACCOs? Could this growth in scale be a threat 
to the core SG process? 
   There seems little evidence through these interviews of financial 
maturation into the formal sector currently. CARE is starting to engage 
with the banks to see if they can provide SG-appropriate products. This 
area of engagement with formal financial processes, and perhaps the 
need for new ones (which if SGs recognised their power they could 
possibly influence even more), is once again both a threat and an 
opportunity for SGs.
   Is the increasing numbers and power of men in the groups a threat or 
opportunity? Should this trend be monitored?
   To what extent are SGs leading on to economic and market development 
and to new enterprises? And to what extent are these group based or 
individually based? Does this pose a threat or an opportunity for the 
future of SGs (in the sense that if such enterprises fail, people can lose their 
money and ‘blame’ the SG process)? Should there be more monitoring of 
this development16? Should there be more links to organisations that can 
provide support to market and enterprise development?
To explore these and related questions about what is emerging in the ways 
groups are performing requires ongoing ways of collecting information about 
emerging trends. The approach that we piloted including interviewing groups 
about the project and the wider context and of signs of change, resulted in 
a wealth of qualitative material that can be analysed to show trends and 
triangulate from different perspectives.
12 Some models such as CRS’s Private Service Provider model enable on-going support to be bought as a 
service. 
13  See for example Krijtenburg (2013) and the ideology of “uplifting” through groups in the Kamba 
context. 
14  In fact CARE staff on the ground were engaging with other donors and interventions to develop 
connections for the groups such as building market links to Nairobi, developing new products e.g. 
pickling vegetables.
15  Although it was much in discussion within CARE, and had been the focus of discussions in a recent 
meeting of SG actors. CARE had also provided some training to cluster leaders. 16    Which CARE staff saw as an advantage to them as it gives evidence for future funding explorations.
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This material can be used to trigger discussions between project staff 
themselves at their monthly staff meetings. They can discuss anecdotal 
evidence of emerging change, decide to monitor or collect further qualitative 
evidence, discuss implications for programme change or addressing other 
development needs.  Equally, it may need fresh eyes from time to time (six 
monthly or even yearly) to meet with stakeholder groups and take an external 
view as we have done here. Where there is evidence that emerging pathways 
are seen to be gaining importance, approaches to monitoring them in more 
quantitative ways can then be developed.  This forms the basis of the proposed 
approach to working prospectively that is outlined in section 4. 
Whilst our initial (two day) research process highlighted where emerging 
pathways may interfere and affect each other synergistically or antagonistically, 
it would require further work to trace whether these potential synergies did 
indeed arise. We provided a snap-shot of this process but the complexity-
informed emphasis on tracing over time underlines the need for designing 
an on-going process.
It is also possible to look for these trends by reading existing reports and 
speaking to other researchers with these questions of emerging trends in 
One point was made by every stakeholder group – MFIs have lost their 
grip where savings groups have been established. 
Villagers, government officials and CARE were aware that savings groups 
were reaching their limits unless they could find some way to deal with 
increasing amounts of cash. 
CARE is in discussions to see how banks can respond – including offering 
interest-bearing group bank accounts. CARE was also talking about using 
M-PESA to act as a conduit to savings accounts in banks. They felt the 
banks were taking notice of savings groups since if they continue to grow, 
and they could potentially take a significant amount of capital out of the 
banking system.
One of the chiefs in particular was very keen on the idea of village banks. 
There was a general question (from SG members) as to why you would 
want to put your money anywhere else given interest rates were so much 
higher. 
The development officers were very engaged when talking about changes 
to the finance sector as a result of SGs. They felt that banks were going to 
have to take note, perhaps be forced to set up local branches. They seemed 
very conscious of the collective power of the SGs to change things.
Quotes:
We would like to establish a village bank where we can keep the money from 
the SGs and also offer interest to others. For example, perhaps we could offer 
a service to the village school teachers so they can put their money in our 
bank and gain a higher interest rate than in commercial banks. (chief)
We have to have a bank account in order to receive our salaries but we then 
take it out immediately and put it into the savings groups. (chief) 
No one in the savings groups has microfinance (savings group members and 
chiefs)
SGs are really impacting microfinance (CARE)
Banks are going to have to set up local branches. Lots of money is tied up in 
these savings groups and they want to get their hands on it (development 
officer)
We have worked with Equity Bank to offer products more appropriate for 
savings groups e.g. interest-bearing current accounts, group accounts, 
(CARE)
Mature SGs need banking services for savings (CARE)
95% have mobile phones and use M-PESA (CARE)
We are looking at how to use the phone as a conduit from SGs to the banks 
(CARE)
Agency banking is growing (CARE)
We are not into microfinance now (SG- women)
There is very little microfinance (FBO)
There is no microfinance amongst group members. Some people have bank 
accounts, no groups have bank accounts, M-PESA is used for transactions. 
CBTs
KWFT is dying. They don’t come as much now. (Chief)
Box 3: SGs and financial market development. Information on emerging pathway derived from group interviews
17      Which we reviewed but in less detail.
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mind. And there is also the possibility of comparison with other projects, in 
this case with the work of CRS17, to see if such comparisons throw up further 
questions or opportunities for learning.
3.4  CONCLUSIONS
The evidence from the case studies appears to demonstrate well that the 
contexts in which these projects took place did indeed reflect the factors 
indicated by complexity theory (as set out in Box 1).  Both encountered aspects 
of history and context which supported or detracted from their efforts and 
had to find ways to adapt their intervention to these circumstances. Both also 
recognised the episodic nature of change and the potential for the emergence 
of new and unexpected features.  
Both demonstrate how factors worked synergistically and how the projects 
had to seize opportunities, adapt and finds ways to act in synergy with these 
circumstances.  In the case of CIS, FSD’s interests converged with those of 
existing stakeholders to take change forward while also strategically leading 
this momentum into a new phase of full-file information sharing.  These 
efforts in turn interacted with the wider system in the way rising interest rates 
resulting from macro-economic trends precipitated the concern to control 
them.  This resulted in the ‘tipping point’ of mandating full-file sharing. 
In the case of SGs, the factors are sufficiently diverse that it is not clear 
from secondary data, whether or how different aspects (local economy 
and livelihood activities; prior group histories and experience; local social 
structure and so on), are associated with strong or weak group performance 
and sustainability.  At the level of individuals the requirements of the services, 
as shown in these sources, also interact in different ways with individual’s 
assets, skills and opportunities. In terms of method, working with secondary 
data alone, which has not been designed to capture the time-evolution of 
change, was insufficient to allow exploration of questions of ‘why’ and ‘how’. 
It identified contextual differences but it was not easy to unpick why these 
differences occurred.
Overall, the findings of the case study research suggest that the complexity 
worldview and complexity thinking is indeed relevant to FSD’s context and 
programming: the contexts accord with the notions of complexity as set out 
in Box 1. 
Moreover, this evidence started to highlight particular features of project 
implementation processes that were borne of this complex environment and 
showed the extent to which project teams responded to this complexity (as 
set out in Box 6). Both projects demonstrated  clarity of vision and strength 
of intention, in terms of what was to be achieved.  This included a credit 
information sharing system or appropriate financial services for poor and 
rural communities delivered through low cost mechanisms.  It was clear 
that these strategic visions were held well within projects that were also 
involved in significant detail. For example, SGs involved the detail of training, 
incentives and supervising different delivery channels; CIS involved the detail 
of implementing data formats and getting compliance.  Project teams did, 
especially in the early stages, learn to adapt their programmes to the contextual 
and historical factors they encountered.   The CIS project also demonstrated 
well how opportunities to influence change could be, and were being seized. 
Finally, the work piloted an approach to reviewing impact analysis 
retrospectively, through seeking the ‘story’ of the project, and the issues 
relevant in the wider context. This method works well where there are small 
numbers of stakeholders who know the project well as in the case of CIS.  In 
the case of savings groups it was harder to have a retrospective discussion with 
the group members and local project stakeholders whose perspective on the 
present and future was more compelling. This instead produced evidence of 
‘weak signals’ of potentially emerging impact pathways.  
The work also piloted a method of identifying emerging impact prospectively. 
Interviewing with a view to identifying emerging impact pathways would seem 
to offer an effective method to engage with the ways these pathways start to 
emerge and interact. This can be done by establishing processes to capture 
information from staff in the first place and potentially also establishing six-
monthly or annual group interviews to take an external, more detailed review. 
This could lead on to new hypotheses to monitor - for example whether 
groups that establish group enterprises do better or worse than the average, 
or whether groups where increasing numbers of men take leadership change 
their focus and aspirations. 
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Chapter 4
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMMING, EVALUATION 
AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT
In this section, we consider the implications of adopting a complexity 
worldview – for programming, for evaluation and for impact assessment. The 
third section in particular builds on learning from the piloted methodologies 
in the case studies.
4.1  IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMMING
In Box 4 we set out a complexity-informed view of the nature of change.  In 
summary, one cannot assume that linear cause-and-effect chains exist and it 
is necessary to question the implicit assumption that contexts are stable and 
that outcomes will indeed unfold from the plans we design.
The question addressed in this section is what does this complexity-informed 
view of the nature of change imply for methods of programming and 
implementation? 
At its extreme, complexity theory could be taken to imply that there is no 
point in planning or monitoring because the whole focus is about dealing 
with uncertainty and adapting to changing circumstances. We would not take 
this view, however. For large-scale interventions such as savings groups or 
hunger safety nets, being clear – as to goals and methods and monitoring 
– and persisting in their achievement, remain of central importance. What 
changes (with a complexity worldview) is how to plan for a greater degree of 
flexibility to respond to the unexpected, to seize opportunities and to adapt to 
changing circumstances. It is also necessary to be able to spot both anticipated 
and unanticipated emerging signs of change by embedding processes of 
monitoring into the project. 
   Systemic and synergistic:
 ¶  There are multiple and interacting causes.
 ¶  There are multiple and interacting outcomes and impacts.
   Historical/path dependency:
 ¶  There can be time delays between interventions and impacts 
(and things may get worse before they get better – the so-
called ‘J’ curve18).
 ¶  The impact of past interventions and events can affect the 
impact of current interventions. A  conventional baseline may 
not capture such effects.
   Context
 ¶  Change is heterogeneous, is affected by the local context.
 ¶  The context itself is dynamic and changing during the project.
   Emergence
 ¶  Interventions may have unintended consequences.
 ¶  New features can emerge that were not expected,  planned for or 
monitored.
   Episodic:
 ¶  Change is episodic – periods of relative stasis followed by periods 
of radical change with emergent features that could not have been 
predicted.
A complexity-framed approach to programming is summarised in Box 5. The 
first step is to undertake a broad context analysis, in which time is spent 
both researching the wider context – the social, political, economic and 
environmental factors and the role of key actors within it – and taking a 
historical perspective on these factors, to understand what has shaped the 
current context and what is the strength of current institutions and patterns 
and features.
In parallel it is important to undertake an organisational analysis, to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses and attitudes and culture and 
institutions of the funding and implementing organisations. This will make 
explicit how embedded attitudes and institutions might affect decision-
making, what will help and hinder working towards the goals and what work 
should be undertaken directly and what through alliances with other actors.
The next step is to ‘weave’ a set of goals or intentions, working with a 
broad stakeholder group to agree what can be achieved - informed by the 
context analysis to take account of these myriad and systemic factors. ‘Weaving’ 
is taken to signify a process of reflexive and interconnected discussion from 
which new ideas can emerge. This is in contrast to a process of arguing from 
distinct perspectives, where outcomes are more influenced by which argument 
or which stakeholder has most power.19 
Such a group can also be established as a steering group for the project, able to 
review progress on a regular basis, and debate where changes – to intentions 
or to implementation - should be made along the way. The idea that things 
will not go to plan, that the unexpected will emerge, that the context will 
change will require a different sort of budgeting, providing contingency to 
allow flexibility.  It will also need a different sort of mindset. 
Then the initial steps of the project are planned and piloted (or more 
than one approach may be piloted), to gain insight into what works best 
18 Woolcock, 2009.
Box 4:  A complexity-informed perspective on  
the nature of change
19   So, for example, if there are social arguments standing in opposition to economic arguments, the 
economic arguments often ‘win’ – a reflexive process is more likely to find new solutions which are 
‘win-win’. This is treating the process as complex – allowing multiple interconnections and providing 
the space for emerging and innovative intentions.
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and under what circumstances. Based on the learning from the pilot, a wider 
implementation is then carried out.  But the difference here is that there is 
a strong recognition that approaches may still need to be customised for 
different circumstances and need to adapt to what emerges. Ideally, 
detailed plans are still relatively short-term within the framework of longer-
term plans which are more sketched out. There needs to be regular review and 
reflection to see what has worked well and less well, what requires changing 
and what has resulted or emerged that requires attention. This review process 
is best handled in a deliberate fashion so that any learning is explicit and 
decisions are well-justified. Otherwise, implementation can be too uncertain 
and provide an excuse for lack of persistence.
In general then, a complexity-informed approach to implementation finds a 
new middle ground between pre-planning, analysis and persistence on the 
one hand and agility, experimentation and adaptation on the other.  This is in 
contrast to traditional approaches which tend to emphasise the former over 
the latter. A complexity-informed approach requires shorter cycles of planning 
and review to respond to the dynamic nature of change and the potential for 
changing contexts. It emphasises that working a wide stakeholder group, 
taking note of the views of those nearer to and further away from the project 
and embedded in the local context with those with a wider view – is more 
likely to recognise what is working well and what is not, what is changing 
both narrowly and in the wider context. It requires attention to the wider 
systemic contextual issues both before and during implementation; planning 
and implementation become more reflexive.
These ideas are not new and would be considered good practice in much 
project implementation – but a complexity worldview stays the hand of those 
who would cut contingency budgets, those who would feel that there is a ‘best 
practice’ approach that can be applied universally, those who would expect 
things, once planned, to go to plan and who would feel that implementation 
can be undertaken without too much attention to its interconnections with 
wider systemic factors.
It is interesting to note that the steps set out here were in general followed 
within the case studies. The credit-information-sharing project followed these 
steps instinctively (in the sense that the PM and key FSD staff tend to work 
in this step-wise way, sensitive to new challenges and to what unexpected 
outcomes and events must be faced). The early days of the savings groups 
‘story’ illustrate the struggle between a PM who was sensitive to adapting to 
context, experimenting and adapting and an organisation who had more of a 
sense of a ‘right way’ and an optimised methodology they wished to be rolled 
out. The FSD approach has been to pilot options and closely evaluate their 
effectiveness – and the complexity view emphasises the need for continuing 
review and looking-out for the unexpected. 
It is also important to point out that when to persist and when to adapt - or 
when to adopt tried and true models and when to customise - are matters of 
judgement. It is very important when making these calls of judgement, to 
work with a broad stakeholder group which includes representatives of those 
working in the field. It is also important to allow a level of autonomy and not 
over-manage at too high a level. These judgements often need to be made 
when the evidence is qualitative and emerging but is nevertheless tangible to 
those close to the situation, who have built relationships at the local level and 
are in tune with the developing issues.20  
How can learning about adaptation to contexts best occur?  Major differences 
to context are easily recognised – such as taking the SG methodology from 
Western Kenya to Marsabit.  But how adaptation is needed within what 
appear to be more homogeneous environments is often less well understood. 
The diagnosis of uneven project performance is often treated as a learning 
feature in the early stages of project implementation.  However, the search 
for understanding what works becomes less patient as the project timeframe 
evolves and there is pressure to achieve outcomes.  Recognition that effective 
adaptation to context and local conditions is necessary is increasingly 
recognised by approaches which contract to pay by results as they allow 
greater flexibility of what and how implementation takes place.  Of course this 
produces many hazards as to how incentives for results are constructed and 
the bias these create with respect to quality. This is an issue with the different 
SG delivery systems that the SG project is reviewing.  
In summary, the complexity perspective would bring attention to the following 
issues:
   Expect uneven performance over time. 
   Find ways to work with/address the unexpected and unintended factors 
that work towards/against your goal  - the things that are beyond the 
risks/assumptions that can be defined a priori. 
   Recognise and learn from variation across regions and between regions. 
   Work with and monitor wider impacts where possible in order to 
understand feedback loops and how these also support / undermine the 
goal.
With projects that are more unique, more a ‘one off’ as with the credit reference 
project, then the balance between programming and seizing opportunities 
and adapting will differ from a larger-scale roll-out as with savings groups. The 
importance of maintaining and bringing into the foreground the long-term 
goals and using these to make choices about where to place effort, cannot 
be over-emphasised. Otherwise projects can wander in an unfocused way. 
Having said this, there will be aspects of such strategic projects which will still 
20   The literature on “brokers” and “translators” which explains how field workers operate to develop 
relationships and interpret project intentions and support into local contexts, along with a literature on 
street-level bureaucrats which explains how policy is mediated by front line implementers is relevant 
to this issue (Lewis & Mosse, 2006; Lipsky, 2010; Mosse, 2005).
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4.2  IMPLICATIONS FOR EVALUATION
Complexity thinking requires a path-dependent approach that connects 
the past with the present and the present with the emerging future. So any 
project team or management team must be adept at looking forwards –be 
able to scan for changes and explore scenarios and ‘foresight’ (see footnote 2 
above). They must be adept at looking backwards, at understanding what has 
led to the present, at identifying what deep-seated institutionalised factors are 
in play. And they must look in detail at the present, seeing the details and 
particularities of the context, both wide and narrow. 
Complexity thinking also requires recognition of the episodic nature of 
change.  This requires sensitivity to critical junctures which may become the 
moments for radical change to emerge, and a willingness to persist in ‘building 
the ground’ in times of stasis.
Finally, complexity thinking emphasises the dynamic and uncertain nature 
of ‘the way things are’ – the fact that there are inevitably unintended 
consequences and unexpected events and shifts.
How do we encapsulate these requirements into competencies? Box 6 provides 
a summary. There are competencies associated with forward-looking, with 
thinking of the longer-term which we have labelled as ‘aspiring’; there are 
competencies associated with looking a few steps ahead, seeing where 
critical junctures might occur and working towards amassing influence and 
resources around such key opportunities. We label these ‘anticipating’. There 
are competencies associated with dealing with dynamism and uncertainty – 
which we collect under the heading of ‘adapt’. And finally there is the need to 
respond to the notion that every context is unique and requires a degree of 
‘customisation’.
The need for projects to be designed to scan for changes in the wider 
environment, to recognise unexpected outcomes related to the project and to 
adapt accordingly in line with the complexity of the situation, changes the focus 
for evaluation. Conventional evaluations of project implementation processes 
would not necessarily look for evidence of adaptability and experimentation 
(as set out in Box 2) but rather, would focus primarily on whether plans and 
actions defined at the outcome had been implemented according to the plan. 
Adopting a complexity-informed approach to programming therefore has 
implications for how the project is evaluated. It will be important to evaluate 
to what extent opportunities were seized, relationships built, experiments 
undertaken - all shaped by clear and strong longer-term intentions whilst not 
losing focus on outcomes.
1. Undertake a broad-ranging and historically-informed context 
analysis including review of current and previous interventions.
2. Undertake an ‘organisational analysis’ of funding and implementing 
organisations to identify locked-in institutional factors and 
lacunae.
3. Establish a broad stakeholder group and ‘weave’ long-term goals 
and intentions together, building on the context analysis.
4. Decide broadly on theory of change and theory of implementation 
in light of (2) and budget – but keep a contingency budget to 
allow experimentation and the need to adapt in later stages.
5. Pilot designed approach for the initial stages – or approaches – 
and refine methodology.
6. In light of 4, define programme, and theories of change and 
implementation and commence implementation; make explicit 
whether different contexts need differing approaches.
7. Allow for a degree of customisation to interpret intentions at local 
level but in a way that is documented and can be reviewed.
8. Develop detailed short-term plans but allow longer-term plans to 
remain looser.
9. Design in  regular review processes (note, depending on the size of 
the project this process may need to be replicated at a more local 
level as well as at the overall programme level) – with a broad 
stakeholder group - which pays attention to:
 ¶  Unintended outcomes.
 ¶  Changes to context.
 ¶  Signs of emerging impacts including those that were not 
expected.
 ¶  Different experiences in different contexts.
10. Plan next stage after review in detail.
11. Modify programme and monitoring in light of 8 – but in an 
explicit way; document changes. Allow for responses to context 
but make explicit what has changed and the reasons for this.
Box 5: Programming to take account of complex contexts
follow conventional practices of programming; for example, implementing 
data collection standards, or designing and rolling out communication and 
training processes. But the decisions to undertake these may arise during the 
project rather than it being clear at the outset that they would be required.
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A meta-theory of implementation
   Aspire
 ¶  Take a wide and systemic view of emerging trends – foresighting 
and scenario-planning.
 ¶  Articulate long-term goals and intentions and use these to develop 
plans, prioritise actions, and determine which opportunities to 
seize. 
 ¶  Persist when there is little evidence of change.
  Anticipate
 ¶  Think a few steps ahead during implementation. What might be 
the consequences of actions, or the consequences of events in the 
wider context?
 ¶  Think through where critical junctures might occur.
 ¶  Scan for changes in the context.
   Adapt
 ¶  Adapt to unexpected events, unintended outcomes.
 ¶  Seize opportunities, making choices in line with long-term goals.
 ¶  Plan activities and projects but review progress regularly and 
take note of changing circumstances and be prepared to modify 
if necessary.
   Customise
 ¶  Take account of contextual and historical factors in developing 
plans and programmes. Do not expect there to be a universally-
appropriate best approach.
 ¶  Experiment – pilot approaches, learn from what works.
 ¶  Take note of the specificity of skills and relationships and factors in 
the wider environment.
Box 6: How should a project team behave to be successful in a complex world?
In its bid to enable change to happen in the financial market FSD’s projects 
can be seen to embody a range of approaches which have the qualities 
discussed above.  Examples are as follows:
Aspiring means that having a perspective on the future development 
of the market is vital to understanding how to strategize for change and 
interpret emerging developments.  This involves having foresight which in 
turn requires constant and dedicated scanning of the wider environment, 
connections with key thought leaders and forward thinkers and the ability 
to construct likely future scenarios.
The scenario building exercises FSD has undertaken with the CBK and 
Ministry of Finance and summarised in the strategy itself, offers a vision 
of how change may or may not happen.  The drivers for these changes 
that are identified offer indicators for monitoring to what extent different 
scenarios may be emerging in practice.  FinAccess retail and business 
have also provided a knowledge base which feeds the ability to plan and 
develop strategies for improved outreach and effectiveness.   However, 
change can take time and enabling it to happen is not always about being 
responsive and testing out approaches.  It can also be about building the 
foundations of understanding and capacity in areas which may take time 
and effort.  This means persisting while keeping the longer-term aims 
and goals in mind.  Examples are where FSD has continued to work with 
the SACCO sector in implementing reforms and building capacity and with 
the FSAs through their transformation.   
Anticipating requires attention to thinking several steps ahead, 
considering how certain actions or current trends may play out into the 
future. A number of projects in the portfolio are anticipating how the 
sector is developing and building the base for these to be effectively 
implemented as it moves forward.  Examples include: work on financial 
education and capabilities; Government payments; the National payments 
switch; and health and life micro-insurance market analysis. 
Adapting to the unexpected unfolding of events is something that FSD has 
repeatedly done and this consequently involves seizing opportunities when 
they present themselves.  For example, the support to CBK in understanding 
the regulatory options for M-PESA as it started to demonstrate unexpected 
success (see Box 8) is such an example.  FSD’s projects often emerge out 
of opportunities although it is not easy to identify these from project 
documents. Further, FSD projects are frequently defined in sufficiently 
broad ways to allow for adaptation to occur as the project proceeds.  The 
credit reference project was an example of seizing the opportunity of the 
CBK launching the guidelines for mandatory negative information sharing 
to leverage on this new development to lay the groundwork for positive 
information sharing.
Box 7:  The FSD programme from the dynamic perspective of complexity
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4.3  IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPACT ASSESSMENT
In order to discuss the implications of complexity theory for impact 
assessment it is necessary to address the core of the current debate around 
impact assessment (IA) methodologies and this relates to the ways in which 
inferences of causality are to be established.  Further background to these 
issues is provided in Annex 1.  The following section then raises a number of 
issues related to the dynamics of change that this approach raises for impact 
assessment.  The third section outlines an over-arching approach to impact 
assessment which spans ‘working prospectively’ and ‘working retrospectively’ 
that seeks to incorporate these insights. The final section briefly discusses how 
this approach relates to FSD’s work. 
4.3.1  Addressing causal inference
The key requirement of impact assessment is that it is necessary to have a 
robust approach to inferring causality from the intervention to the results. 
Weak approaches simply examine the co-presence of the cause and the effect, 
and many past impact assessments have done this.  But a key result of the 
recent attention to randomised control trials (RCTs) and its reputation as a 
‘gold standard’ methodology has been to raise the bar on the rigour required 
in assessing causality.   
There are broadly two approaches to examining active causality.21  The first is 
experimental and makes use of opportunities to manipulate an intervention 
such that people who randomly receive an intervention can be compared to 
those who do not (the counterfactual).  Designed in this way, RCTs allow the 
direction of causality from the intervention to the impacts to be deduced.  
Second, are approaches which examine the causal pathway in depth in order 
to construct or refine the theory of change.22  These approaches are referred 
to as theory-based impact evaluation.  Their standard of ‘proof’ is one which 
seeks to establish these connections “beyond reasonable doubt”  (White & 
Phillips, 2012, p. 7) by starting with the programme’s theory of change and 
then examining rigorously, using logic, whether it was borne out in practice. 
Methodologies which take this approach include contribution analysis 
and process tracing as these are generally applied (see Annex 1 for more 
discussion).  Another called realist evaluation, seeks to identify an underlying 
theory by postulating mini-theories of different causal pathways and then 
examining which ones are operating in which ways in practice before drawing 
these together.  The rigour of these approaches to causality is therefore derived 
from thorough and logical thinking rather than that of comparing experimental 
results against a counterfactual where there is no intervention.23   
While RCTs have recently come to be seen as the most rigorous methodology 
in impact assessment, there are clear limitations to their use.  They can only be 
used where there is a sufficiently large population of people or units of analysis 
that are affected by the intervention.  So, for example, they can be used in 
principle to examine the impact of SGs24  but not to assess the impact of CIS on 
interest rates.  This has tended to draw an operational dividing line between 
the types of projects that can and cannot be assessed using RCTs.  However, 
there are many operational issues that can also detract from their effective use 
(see also annex 2).    
Other criticisms of RCTs arise from their inability to peer into the “black box” 
of what is actually going on inside an intervention.  While it is necessarily the 
case that effects on which RCTs seek evidence are informed by a theory of 
change26  the dynamics of how these are in fact operating are rarely revealed 
by RCTs themselves27. Results derived may therefore not occur as expected 
and be difficult to explain.  Simply knowing whether average effects suggest 
Box 7 continued
Customising and experimenting with approaches and products is a 
feature of many FSD projects.  Some involve getting something started 
in the local context (e.g. warehouse receipts and index based weather 
insurance); others involve working to get particular approaches off 
the ground (Centre for Branchless Banking; supply chain trade finance 
support; value chain finance centre; G2P payments development).  When 
customising approaches to the context, it is important to do so in a rigorous 
manner so that learning can be captured and acted upon (and there are 
examples e.g. with savings groups, where FSD takes this approach).
21 See Annex 1 by Befani in Stern et al, 2012. 
22 See for example Vogel (2012) where a Theory of Change is seen to involve discussion of: context;  the 
long term change intended; the process or sequence of change anticipated; the assumptions about 
how this might happen; and a diagram or narrative summary capturing this discussion.  Her review 
that this needs to be kept
23  There is also a range of methods that use quantitative methods that are not experimental but which 
we do not discuss here.  These are also frequently criticised as not attaining the rigour of RCTs, which 
include exploiting available datasets for natural experiments.  They are also useful where data exists 
that can be exploited, but are not especially relevant to FSD’s programme. 
24 See for example (BARA & IPA, 2010).
25 Although they can be used to test whether the availability of credit reports affects people’s borrowing 
behaviour. 
26 For example, an RCT of SGs is likely to focus more on collecting evidence of whether consumption is 
smoothed or assets increased.  It may collect data on whether participants have taken up local social 
or political positions but it may not go as far as collecting data on whether men have withdrawn or 
reduced their contributions to household budgets.  Indeed, there are many potential effects and causal 
pathways and it is simply not possible to collect data that addresses all of them.  
27 Though in theory they can be if the micro detail of causal pathways can be adequately captured in 
indicators such that those pathways can be appropriately tested.  
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something has worked or not may not adequately serve the purposes of 
interveners who wish to understand much more about the dynamics of how 
an intervention is working disaggregated by socio-economic categories and 
their interactions with contexts.  It can therefore be argued that RCTs are, in 
any case, best complemented by investigation that seeks to examine whether 
the theories of change posited are in fact at work.28    
Both of these approaches - experimental approaches and theory-based 
evaluations - assumes that there are sufficient regularities that causality is 
indeed identifiable.  However, in the context of the approach to complexity 
outlined above, a more nuanced position on causality is to recognise that 
in reality causal pathways are rarely linear or independent.  This means that 
what leads to what is always due to many factors at the micro level.  If the 
context is stable and patterns emerge that are stable – then linear causality 
appears to be acting at the meso- or macro-level and is a sufficiently good 
approximation. But in general and to understand the dynamics of change, it is 
necessary to look at the detail - especially in the early stages of projects when 
evidence is weak and change is only beginning to emerge. 
Complexity theory would argue that outcomes have multiple and interacting 
causes and indeed the ways these causes interact are likely to change over 
the course of the project. Seeking to identify what contributes to what is best 
achieved by following the actions and outcomes of the project as the project 
unfolds. If this cannot be done then the contribution of the project can best be 
investigated through retrospective pattern detection.  
This is not at all to imply that working with a proposed theory of change when 
planning and implementing an intervention is not useful.  But it does suggest 
that when approaching an impact assessment, starting from this theory of 
change may be too limiting to the approach to the enquiry and this would 
importantly be more open-ended.  Approaching impact assessment is then 
about seeking to understand the way in which the intervention makes a 
contribution29  to impact and to seek to identify the scales, scope and means 
through which this has happened.  It suggests that in some contexts it may 
be more useful to do this in a more open-ended way to explore the actual 
pathways of change, than to theorise these in detail from the outset.  
Even where causality is relatively well known and established through 
evidence from a range of contexts, (i.e. where RCTs might be an appropriate 
methodology), they may still need to be complemented by broader 
assessments.  Impact assessment must always look for unexpected impacts. 
Some of these can occur both in the units of analysis specified in the theory 
of change and beyond it, as the effects ripple out to and interact with “wider” 
parts of the system.  Such impacts may be particularly important where they 
operate in ways that importantly support or undermine the narrower theory 
of change.  An example from the case of CIS (above), is the unanticipated use 
of credit reports for vetting public appointments.  This may be important in 
gaining the acceptance of CIS by the public and overcome the backlash that 
was initially being experienced against the use of negative reporting.  This 
wider pathway of impact invokes debates over integrity in public life and not 
solely individual relationships with lenders. Recognising and understanding 
this and its recursive effects on the intervention may be particularly important 
to the trajectory of the intervention in the Kenyan context. 
As a result, this approach to complexity suggests that it is important to 
engage with the detail of the processes of change that are occurring, especially 
where the characteristics and degree of stability of the system30  are not well 
understood.  However, even where linear change has been evident in the past, 
this does not necessarily mean that it will persist into the future.  This raises 
further issues for conceptualising and assessing the impact of interventions. 
4.3.2  Further implications of complexity theory for impact 
assessment 
There are a number of further implications of complexity thinking for 
conceptualising and assessing the impact of interventions.  
Baselines
Impact assessment conventionally suggests that a baseline should be taken 
at the start of a project against which change can be measured.  Complexity 
thinking suggests that it is necessary to attend to this in a richer way.  While 
baselines are often established as a set of indicators of the context at a point in 
time, complexity suggests that it is important to understand it dynamically.  In 
particular it is necessary to identify the way change has happened in the past 
and the contextual and historical factors that affect this.  This would encompass 
particular social, economic and political factors that can affect outcomes and 
impact.  This starts to lay a foundation for understanding the contribution of 
28 The debate over the impact of microcredit programmes and the use of RCTs is a striking case in point.  
Despite the limited evidence that high quality RCTs have shown for impact on incomes (see the 
systematic reviews on this subject), “randomistas” themselves have argued for the need to undertake 
further tests so essentially believing that the theory of change still stands and needs to be tested 
across a wider number of interventions.  It might therefore be advisable to engage in more assessment 
that better seeks to understand why the causal pathways of the TOC do not appear to be working as 
proposed.  From a complexity perspective, the point can be made that even though these appear to be 
operating in relatively stable contexts, the impacts they posit especially on incomes (or expenditure/
consumption) are the product of open systems dynamics.  These have such a wide range of influences 
that the causal pathways between microcredit as an input and increased incomes as an impact are 
the subject of many intervening dynamic processes. It is notable that many RCTs in this field are in fact 
conducted on much shorter causal pathways. This may be for e.g. between advertising and take-up 
of a product or between different modes of take up and delivery  rather than variables whose causal 
links are necessarily more distant and therefore subject to more complexity dynamics (see for example 
(Karlan & Appel, 2012). 
29  Here we use contribution in the way used by John Mayne (Mayne, 2008, 2011). 
30  The relevant level of stability will vary.  It could be a household, a village, a location / region or the 
whole country depending on the type of intervention and the focus of the effects sought. For example, 
the impact of access to finance for women can vary due to the state of intra-household relations.  
These might be stable and supportive and ensure co-operation in the repayment of credit or may 
be unstable producing conflict. The woman taking a loan may interact with this to exacerbate this 
situation and result in violence.  
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a project to processes of change that are already underway.  This applies to 
baseline surveys of individuals, households or larger units of analysis such as 
sub-sectors, sectors, local or national economies. It suggests the importance of 
understanding past trajectories of change.  This might, for example, lead to an 
individual or household survey that collects indicators of change experienced 
over a preceding period and then analyses them to understand the features of 
local economic change that are at work.  
Emerging change
Following on from this, it is obvious that the context in which the project is being 
undertaken will also be changing during its implementation.  When planning, 
project and programme managers usually consider what is happening and 
how these factors might play out in relation to the intervention. These factors 
are commonly captured as assumptions and risks in logical frameworks or 
similar planning approaches.  Complexity underlines the importance not only 
of considering these at the outset, but of regularly tracking their evolution 
during the project to see whether and how they are building up or dissolving 
away, and what new risks or supporting (convergent) factors are emerging. 
While this is the terrain of good project management, it is not usually 
undertaken in ways that ensure these are documented and hence are available 
to project reviewers and impact assessors.  This on-going perspective on the 
wider context and on emerging changes within the sphere of the project will 
inform the project process itself. It will also allow discussion about emergent 
impacts and requirements for monitoring
Impact in relation to the episodic nature of change
These features are important to recognise, because of the episodic nature 
of change.  In order appropriately to assess the contribution of a project to 
change, the way in which change is occurring is important to understand. 
Hence some projects may be ‘building the ground’ while others are fortunate 
to be there when a ‘tipping point’ is reached.   Without this perspective it is 
possible to over-emphasise the impact of particular events or projects, which 
seemed to ‘tip the balance’ and under-emphasise the impact of periods which 
changed attitudes and established the conditions for change, but where there 
was little evidence to show.  The impact pathway may also be one in which the 
indicators of interest get worse before they get better and the dynamics of such 
situations are vital to understand as failure may be misdiagnosed.  Projects 
intended to produce change may have made an important contribution 
though not resulting in the change expected.  This may be seen for example, in 
attitudes which can be difficult to achieve, or that it was necessary to counter 
trends that were not initially understood. 
This does not open the door to condoning failure on the basis that change 
is not yet evident.  Project evaluators must apply critical judgement as to 
whether the project was effectively implemented against the features set out 
above.  They must then clearly demonstrate with well sourced and triangulated 
evidence the way the project was addressing contexts and patterns that were 
slow to change, how it met with entrenched interests and sought to address 
them and so on.  Impact assessors must similarly demand robust evidence of 
the features of the context and triangulate evidence of impacts across space, 
time and other interventions.  Impact assessors must approach the task with 
a strong understanding of their methodology and set out evidence for their 
conclusions in rigorous ways. 
Time 
Finally, complexity thinking emphasises the dimension of time – the need to 
trace sequences of events and trace how impact emerges is part of the view 
of things constantly ‘becoming’ rather than ‘being’31. This is to be contrasted 
with a view of the world as primarily stable - where how things change is less 
important than what they have changed into.
This does also suggest the need for assessing impact to be undertaken over a 
period of time which extends beyond the project’s timeframe, as change may 
take time to emerge.
External validity
It is important to recall that the issue of external validity (whether the 
results found in one project will occur when the same project intervention is 
implemented somewhere else with similar features) is relevant to all impact 
assessments, whether RCTs or theory-based approaches.  The perspective of 
complexity makes this even more significant.  Indeed, it makes the issue of 
external validity a burning question from the programming perspective right 
through to assessing impact.  
Complexity thinking brings into question the extent to which programme 
designs will ever work in the same way in different places even when 
the features of the different settings seem similar. At the same time, 
approaches such as process tracing offer a way to test core methodologies 
and understand the way they work in practice. So, for example, the core 
methodology of savings groups has been refined through paying attention to 
how they are effective though experimentation and through observing many 
implementations. Providing there is some flexibility to adapt to context, these 
core methodologies have stood the test of time. Process tracing speaks to the 
question as to how and why things work. In some cases, this time-sequencing 
will show up transient factors which were central to creating the path towards 
success but which can get forgotten and overlooked if attention is only given 
to outcomes. So following the history of the project can throw up surprising 
lessons and refine approaches about how customisation and adaptation are 
better managed32 - issues which tend to be overlooked in the search for what 
works. 
31 A terminology used by the complexity theorist Prigogine.
32 It is notable for example that in the vast array of literature on microfinance there is little, if any, that 
focuses on the process of how to customise approaches to different contextual and historical factors. 
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Nevertheless, even in apparently very similar situations, it is important to 
remember that local events and circumstances will always make a difference 
to the pathway and outcomes will never be identical in different circumstances. 
So it is important not to over-engineer approaches and to allow space for 
adaptation and customisation. 
4.3.3 A proposed approach 
Based on the above considerations two related approaches are proposed 
through which FSD can more systematically engage with an impact assessment 
agenda in the context of complexity.  These draw on the core ideas presented 
above and develop the methodology of process tracing. The idea of process 
tracing is that an explicit chronology of events is identified - through historical 
accounts, interviews and any available quantitative data.  This seeks to identify 
the causal links and pathways which lead actions through to impact. In its 
pure form there is still an assumption of linearity and independence of actions. 
In some cases the actual pathway is compared with the expected pathway 
embedded in the theory of change and traced from expected outcome back 
through implementation. However, we believe that this technique can be 
developed to include multiple causes and be used both prospectively and 
retrospectively to provide an effective means of impact assessment in projects 
in complex contexts as discussed below.
Working prospectively
In developing methods that look forwards, impact monitoring and process 
tracing can be embedded in the project.  We illustrated in section 3.5 how 
insights into the impact trajectories of savings groups could be obtained 
through interviewing stakeholder groups – e.g. chiefs, district officers, trainers, 
savings group staff and so on – and analysing and triangulating key points that 
were made during the discussions. This method was used to indicate a number 
of emerging impact pathways which were not necessarily those identified at 
the beginning of the project as core but which nevertheless could grow in 
importance and potentially influence the evolution of key impact goals as well 
as provide further contribution to economic and social development.
The most effective way to try and gain evidence of contribution is for the 
project team to look out for signs of emerging change or changing conditions 
and to start to monitor such changes as implementation proceeds.  This can 
initially be done qualitatively, that is, by regularly noting these signs and 
changing conditions in project meetings and documenting them through 
management systems.  As these are noted some will appear to fade away 
while others may become particularly important.  Decisions can then be made 
as to which to trace. These can be monitored by collecting more data about 
them – this may be both qualitative (types, nature, contexts in which they 
occur, relative importance) and then collected quantitatively as indicators are 
identified which can capture the scale of these changes.  
So, for example, if in the savings group project, project team members start 
to notice an increase in groups themselves taking up particular types of group 
level enterprise, they may discuss this in project meetings and should the 
evidence for their emergence persist, they may decide to monitor their type 
and number. They may also take note as to whether or not groups undertaking 
group level enterprises fare better in relation to the core impact of sustaining 
The FSD Impact Assessment report of 2010 identifies the way in which 
FSD’s responsiveness to the regulatory issues arising out of M-PESA’s 
development helped it to get off the ground. FSD was able to source the 
input of an international consultant to advise the Central Bank on the 
regulatory issues surrounding M-PESA and to indicate to them that they 
did not need to regulate it directly.  Instead they could afford to take a light 
touch approach because it did not represent a systemic risk to the banking 
sector or financial sector more broadly.  This could be identified as a critical 
juncture in enabling M-PESA to operate in a way that allowed it to grow.  
In terms of the attribution of M-PESA’s success, it is clear that this input 
came at the right time and was very important. It enabled key factors 
to come together though it was but one moment in the development 
story, and Safaricom had done a huge amount of work in developing the 
model, its agent systems, marketing and so on.  In addition, factors such 
as population mobility, use of texting, lack of current cheap, convenient 
and reliable alternatives for sending money, also contributed (Heyer & 
Mas, 2011). Research has shown how the success of M-PESA is also due to 
the way inter-personal transfers within social networks are an important 
feature of the way Kenyan’s manage their financial and other resources. 
M-PESA synergised well with this social context (Johnson, Brown, & 
Fouillet, 2012).  
Hence, while Safaricom was building the ground, FSD, with its particular 
focus on regulatory issues, helped to tip the balance and enable a tipping 
point to happen. If the regulators had not been sufficiently confident to 
allow it to go ahead then it is likely that M-PESA’s growth would have not 
been as dramatic. In this case it is very clear that it would be erroneous 
to attribute the whole of M-PESA’s success to FSD’s intervention. It does 
however, illustrate why it is difficult to assess that contribution. The 
regulatory decision may have been necessary but was by no means a 
sufficient condition. 
Based on (Stone et al., 2010)
Box 8: FSD’s role in M-PESA’s success: Contributing to a “tipping point” but avoiding the over-attribution problem
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the group to ensure greater financial resilience.  In other words, how does 
this wider impact of enterprise development support or undermine the core 
impact pathway?
To take an example from the credit reference work, the project team had 
various information and insights on the way credit reports were being used. 
These ranged from being used to ensure repayment to their use in a limited 
way for loan assessment to how they had become part of the selection process 
for public officials.  It is possible therefore to more consistently note these in 
monitoring reports.  The project was already recognising their limited use in 
loan assessment and developing another project which would address this as 
it clearly demonstrated a lack of capacity in the sector to undertake risk-based 
pricing in the future.  The way they were being used for screening high profile 
appointments (in banks themselves, in public sector offices, in parastatals 
and use in other private company recruitment processes etc.) could be 
monitored by noting them in newspaper reports or anecdotes. Tracing how 
this evolves over time would provide good evidence of an impact that could 
be significant if not intended. 
Thus such tracing of wider impacts becomes embedded in the project process 
thus providing a much richer source of information by the end of the project as 
to how change is happening and thinking evolving. Also, being alert to new 
factors and unexpected impacts may inform the project process and allow 
learning and response which will, of course, also increase the likelihood of 
positive impact.
It is also important to point out that project teams need to become accustomed 
to noting what is new and may be significant and that such a process can 
be aided through providing an external perspective from time to time. 
For example, as some of the savings groups started to build clusters it was 
noticeable that leadership of the groups and clusters was increasingly falling 
to men. This could be a very significant change – if men start to dominate the 
management of the groups how will this affect the success of the groups? 
Such a change may be easier to spot from the outside as such changes often 
tend to ‘creep up’ on project teams. So a short review process involving external 
actors which meets groups, works with other stakeholders and seeks signs of 
emerging change, may be an useful addition to an ongoing process embedded 
in the project.
Working retrospectively
Whilst changing project and management processes in the ways suggested 
above are important in order to ‘embrace complexity’ as the project proceeds, 
the question still remains as to how to assess impact retrospectively. As 
discussed above, we suggest the development of process tracing as a particular 
method which can assist with this in retrospective evaluations and impact 
assessments (Hughes and Hutchings 2012). The argument is that if you want 
to try and establish contribution, you have to follow the project process from 
its inception (taking into account the ‘complexity baseline’ as discussed above), 
through its implementation and then into its impact. This both informs why 
and how things happened as well as what happened and gives the best 
possibility of assessing contribution as you follow the project actions and aim 
to trace what they contributed. 
The interview process we followed, tracing the history of the project and 
exploring the wider context and historical antecedents as described in section 
3, is one way to undertake this. It is obviously important to work with a range 
of stakeholders who can tell the ‘story’ of the project, give their views as to 
what happened and why and discuss what the project contributed.   These 
accounts can then be triangulated and other information – in project literature 
or in wider reports – can also be used in this triangulation process. It may also 
be possible to identify other data which helps to contextualise the efforts of 
the project and therefore support the understanding of its contribution, such 
as newspaper reports on interest rate changes in the case of the CIS.33  And the 
focus of the questions is not only to ask respondents about the project, but also 
to ask them what else was going on that might contribute to or work against 
success – to ask them about the wider factors and about other actors.
For savings groups, which is a ‘large n’ project, we dealt with the retrospective 
view through interviewing project managers and other key staff who had 
been involved with the project over several years, knew its history and were 
comfortable with this sort of reflective process. This approach would need 
modification to work with individual members, with savings groups directly, 
with SMEs and so on.  This could involve using similar narrative methods 
with individuals which seek to explore changes that have happened in their 
lives and teases out the various ways in which this has happened and the 
contribution of the intervention to this.  Given that the past is often difficult to 
reconstruct in this way over longer periods of time, impact monitoring visits 
with a cohort of individuals (a qualitative panel) which occur for example 
annually, could offer deeper insights into the trajectories of change occurring 
in their lives and allow the contribution of the intervention to these changes 
to be assessed. Such a methodology would warrant further investigation (see 
Annex 3 for more discussion).  
33    For example, the CIS project is intended to contribute to lowering interest rates. Establishing causality 
here is extremely difficult when trying to directly relate the level of interest rates in the economy to the 
implementation of CIS. The CIS has - at best - the possibility of producing overall reductions relative 
to what they would have been, but the actual level of interest rates is influenced by much more 
volatile and significant macro-economic factors.  Effective assessment of contribution needs also to 
take a view on the relative role of these wider factors while commissioning a full economic analysis 
of interest rates in Kenya is not entirely appropriate to the task in hand. Monitoring movements 
through for example press and other economic reporting and their discussion of related factors at work 
provides a richer context against which the outcomes of the project can be assessed.  
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4.3.4 Deciding what is appropriate in FSD’s projects
The proposed approach outlined in the last section offers an over-arching 
framework for FSD to start to extend its internal systems for monitoring 
impact. It can also effectively feed into evaluation and impact assessment 
to be undertaken both internally and by independent outsiders.  The 
approach to working prospectively is applicable to all of FSD’s projects.  The 
retrospective approach is also applicable to most of its projects providing 
there are interviewees who have sufficient involvement with the project over 
time that they can take a long view.  FSD may nevertheless wish to engage 
with RCT34 type studies where these are particularly appropriate. This might 
Systemic and synergistic: causality at the micro level is not linear.  It 
is more appropriate to trace pathways through which interventions 
over time contribute to change except where very stable conditions allow 
inferences from considering stable patterns at the meso- or macro-level.
History: it is necessary to consider the base line not only at the start of 
a project, but also to understand the antecedents to this baseline so that 
the role of instituted factors is understood and the playing out of previous 
interventions is taken into account.
History: retrospectively, process tracing can be used to trace the pathways 
from intervention into contribution, triangulating across multiple 
perspectives.
Context: We cannot in general assume external validity – i.e. that if 
it works in one place it will work in another.  Complexity offers a richer 
approach to assessing what is required in external validity. 
Emergence: for the future, project and management processes should 
aim to spot emerging outcomes as well as unintended consequences and 
also monitor the broader context and track and respond to changes.
Episodic: too much may be attributed to an intervention at tipping points 
and not enough during periods of stasis.  Therefore conclusions should 
not be drawn too quickly and impact assessment needs to be undertaken 
sometime after the end of a project.
Box 9: Complexity implications for impact
be when (analytically) the conditions are judged as sufficiently stable and 
where the RCTs are therefore likely to have the real potential to yield important 
contributions to knowledge.    
It is important to raise the issue of resources.  It is necessary to invest adequate 
resources in impact assessment work of any kind whether this is RCTs or 
approaches that are methodologically based on theory and use qualitative 
research methods.  While the costs of RCTs are now reasonably well understood, 
the kinds of qualitative approach which theory-based impact evaluation 
represents also require adequate resources if they are to be undertaken 
thoroughly.  Rigorous impact assessment necessarily comes at a cost.  
34  Other quantitative methodologies have not been extensively discussed here but there is scope for these 
especially in FSD’s research role as a knowledge generator for the sector. 
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSIONS AND NEXT STEPS FOR FSD 
Complexity thinking provides a critique of and challenge to the level of 
certainty that is frequently assumed in conventional methods of programming 
and impact analysis. The over-arching message is that we can predict, plan, 
and attribute with less certainty than we would like. Complexity theory 
provides a worldview emphasising interconnectedness and the potential for 
the emergence of new factors. It can lead to a change in emphasis between 
planning and experimenting, between efficiency and responsiveness, between 
clarity of focus and breadth of perspective. It suggests that it is necessary to 
be somewhat tentative in concluding what works, and to be more willing to 
experiment. It emphasises that it is necessary to build in processes of learning 
and adaptation which respond to context and changing circumstances. It 
brings into question whether there are ‘best’ methods or unique frameworks. 
It recognises that taking note of history, understanding context and identifying 
changes through the building of a strong stakeholder group, and judging 
when to seize opportunities or adapt may be equal in importance to careful 
design and planning. 
This research has shown that FSD’s work, in seeking to catalyse change and 
innovate in a dynamic and fast changing market, certainly sits within a 
complex world. And this work has shown that, in many cases, project staff are 
cognizant of this and naturally adapt and adopt behaviours that are congruent 
with complex contexts. 
The report has offered an over-arching perspective on how FSD can take forward 
the insights complexity offers for its learning about effective programming for 
change. More detailed proposals about how these can be implemented are 
given in Annex 3. Broadly these involve:
First, inculcating into on-going projects, processes which:
   Look forwards into the wider environment and consider potential shifts 
and changes that might materially affect the project.
   Use systems mapping35 techniques to identify interconnections between 
interventions, and how these interact both broadly with the wider 
environment as well as more narrowly within the intended goals of the 
project.
   Review progress with a wide range of stakeholders on a regular basis to 
identify emerging impact pathways, identify new factors to monitor, and 
consider modifications to the project process.
   Adopt a prospective process tracing methodology, to keep track of 
emerging changes and shifts and identify how these were handled.
When the research was presented at a workshop with theme leaders (see 
Annex 3), they were enthusiastic about finding ways to incorporate these ideas 
into their management processes.  This could also be taken further by piloting 
the approach in a systematic way in at least two quite different projects to 
examine how they can work.  This would involve: 
   Setting up an on-going process with partner projects to develop ways to 
capture relevant outcome and impact information at the ground level by 
working with field staff and management.  
   Instituting regular review processes involving stakeholders and ways 
to collect and analyse this information (e.g. using a ‘narrative fragment’ 
approach - see Annex 1). 
   Developing a methodology to work with a panel of respondents in large 
‘n’ projects using a complexity informed qualitative approach.  
Second, it is proposed that FSD develop and adopt a retrospective process-
tracing approach to assessing impact and evaluating projects. This would build 
on the methods used in the research described in sections 3 and 4. The aim, 
through interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, through use of reports 
and other material, is to build up a picture of the history of the project and 
a triangulated (and reflexively-developed) perspective on the contribution of 
strands of the project to impacts, both intended and unexpected.  
Finally, evaluating projects as they are implemented can be undertaken from 
the perspective of identifying ‘complexity behaviours’ as set out in Box 6.
53   Systems mapping techniques (e.g. as described in soft systems methodologies (Checkland, 1999) 
vary in sophistication from post-it notes on boards to complex software packages. The methods allow 
conceptualisation and representation of interconnections between factors.
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1.1  IMPACT ASSESSMENT: THE STATE OF THE ART 
Over the last ten years, the elevation of randomised control trials (RCTs) as 
the gold standard for impact assessment in international development has 
provoked intense debate to the extent of being termed “paradigm wars” 
(Hughes & Hutchings, 2011, p. 1).  The field of microfinance has been one in 
which such debates have been prominent. The ability of RCTs - or experimental 
methods - to address issues of attribution by ensuring internal validity 
for  ‘large n’36 projects at the micro level, is achieved through the random 
allocation of the intervention between treatment and control groups. However, 
in practice, the gold standard is met by few impact studies in this field to date 
(Duvendack et al., 2011) with the difficulties of implementation raising a 
range of practical and methodological issues.  Average effects in particular 
belie the heterogeneity of impact, reducing the potential for understanding 
for whom - and in what way - change actually occurs.  Further concerns in 
use for summative assessment involve: the problem of low participation rates 
and whether they yield reasonable estimates; issues of variable treatment 
intensities leading to endogeneity and hence challenges in interpretation (such 
as the take-up of credit itself within a treated group); or the appropriateness 
of RCTs as an assessment method for recent, short-term interventions where 
results have yet to emerge (Bernard, Delarue, & Naudet, 2011).  It is important 
to note that the issue of external validity  - the applicability of the findings to 
any other context – remains, as for other impact assessment methodologies 
(Karlan, Goldberg, & Copestake, 2009).  
Given that only some 5% of projects may even meet the criteria for RCT 
designs (Stern et al., 2012) this has elevated the discussion of appropriately 
rigorous methodologies and quality standards for impact assessment using 
alternative methodologies.  These are particularly necessary where ‘n’ is small 
and qualitative methodologies are the only option.  But the debate over RCTs 
has also exposed the limitations of non-randomised quantitative studies 
(Duvendack et al., 2011), and hence suggests the need for greater discussion 
of quality standards for these also.  As Pande et al. show in a systematic review 
of impact studies related to financial inclusion, few actually interrogate or 
consider alternative causal mechanisms  (Pande, Cole, Sivasankaran, Bastian, 
& Durlacher, 2012).
Going beyond experimental methods that enable attribution to the 
intervention, White and Phillips (2012) divide non-experimental methods 
into two groups: first, those that examine the causes of outcomes to establish 
“beyond reasonable doubt” (ibid: 7) how they have occurred; and second, 
those that are less concerned with establishing the causal process but for 
which participation of stakeholders and finding out their perceptions of the 
direction of change is vital to evaluating outcomes and are not regarded as 
sufficiently rigorous.  In the first group there are at least four approaches: 
realist evaluation; general elimination methodology; process tracing and 
contribution analysis (ibid).  All of these involve identifying the explicit or 
implicit theory of change of the intervention; seeking to establish whether 
the outcomes have occurred as anticipated; and whether these have occurred 
based on the causes assumed or as a result of other non-intervention factors.  
Realist evaluation focuses on understanding how the intervention mechanisms 
and their surrounding context produce outcomes in order to answer the 
question of what works, how, under which conditions and for whom (ibid:8). 
It focuses on identifying, collecting and testing the evidence for Contribution 
Mechanism Outcome theories which are intended to build middle-range 
theories of how change happens.  General Elimination Methodology looks 
at the range of possible causes and eliminates those for which there is no 
evidence of a causal link.  Process tracing draws on evidence to connect an 
intervention to an outcome, and then identifies causal mechanisms to connect 
them and the evidence that would need to be observed to verify the actual 
process at work. Contribution analysis builds on this more process based 
approach to allow for reasonable inference -in contrast to attribution which 
focuses on necessary and sufficient conditions (Mayne, 2011). This argues that 
a reasonable contribution can be claimed if (i) there is a reasoned theory of 
change; (ii) that the implemented activities are those set out in the theory of 
change; (iii) the chain of expected results can be shown to have occurred; and 
(iv) other influencing factors have either been shown not to make a difference 
or their relative contribution has been recognised.
Evaluating against a theory of change, also called a programme theory, 
with impact pathways laid out has long been an approach to evaluation. 
Recently in international development there has been much attention given 
to the identification of theories of change as offering a means to improved 
programme planning as well as offering improved frameworks for evaluation. 
This can be seen as in part a reaction to the disparaging of the log-frame. 
The log-frame was originally intended as both a means of identifying a theory 
of change and the risks and assumptions that could enable or undermine it, 
resulting in an evaluation framework of indicators.  This was derived through 
a process of stakeholder discussions.  But its actual use became seen as an 
imposition by donors and poor practice resulted in “lack frames”; “logic-less” 
and “lock frames” (Gasper & Bell, 2000) leading to them being frequently 
regarded as unhelpful.  The recent rise of theories of change seeks to re-
establish many of the features that log-frames have lost.  It seeks to develop 
programme theories derived from reflective development practice through 
stakeholder engagement.  Undertaken in this way, the development of 
theories of change can expose assumptions and deeply-held beliefs about 
how change is expected to happen.37 This allows sufficient flexibility for 
change to emerge and be adapted to during the project. Hence the approach 
Annex 1
IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND COMPLEXITY THEORY 
36    That is where there are a large number of units - such as individuals, households or businesses - on 
which the intervention is expected to have an impact.  ‘Small n’ refers to instances where there are few 
of these and hence RCTs and other quantitative methods cannot be used. 
37   There is reference to complexity thinking in these and reference to emergence, non-linearity, feedback 
loops etc. (see Vogel, 2012).  However, how to work with these and what difference they make is not 
clearly identified. 
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can support innovation for programme improvement. This in turn demands 
performance management approaches that can allow flexibility in the context 
of uncertainty (Vogel, 2012). 
In proposing an ‘integrated’ approach to ‘small n’ impact evaluation, White and 
Phillips suggest that: the questions of attribution must be identified; a theory of 
change should be set out; these together should be used to set out evaluation 
questions and assumptions to be tested and an evaluation plan devised for data 
collection and analysis accordingly; that alternative causal hypotheses should 
be identified and that the causal chain should be verified.  However, this usage 
of theories of change tends to prioritise the establishment of causality over the 
process of stakeholder engagement i.e. it prioritises a search for objectivity over 
an acknowledgement of the existence of subjectivity.  These approaches also 
take the view that people do what they intended to do; that there is stability 
in what was happening and that there is causality. They also act as if there is 
an external objective view which is somehow separate from the admittedly 
subjective, but also more granular view of those involved in the details – and 
time-sequences - of events and contexts. These priorities are established by 
the aid effectiveness debate more broadly in which objective knowledge is 
seen as being achievable and independence in doing this is required, so 
limiting the more participative and reflective dimensions.  It highlights the 
tension between the relative power and objectives of stakeholders arguing 
for more summative externally-conducted approaches which seek to verify 
attribution and causality, over more formative approaches seeking to achieve 
adaptive programme management, and which are also more likely to be able 
to manage meaningful downward accountability to programme participants. 
1.2  COMPLEXITY AND IMPACT EVALUATION 
The implications of complexity thinking for impact assessment and evaluation 
have been considered by (Patton, 1994), Williams and Imam (Systems Concepts 
in Evaluation; An Expert Anthology, 2006), Stern (2012) and Woolcock (2009).
1.2.1  Classification of projects – simple, complicated, chaotic 
and complex
One trend in the literature important to programming, evaluation and impact 
assessment is to focus on the nature of interventions. Can the intervention be 
thought of as simple, complicated or complex (Glouberman and Zimmerman 
(2002), Rogers (2008), Stern (2012))? Woolcock (2012) and Snowden (2002) 
add a fourth classification, chaotic, to this list.
 Woolcock (2012) describes typical ‘simple’ interventions as having predictable, 
simple causal pathways, giving the possibility of measurement precision. He 
suggests building roads or providing fishing nets are ‘simple’ projects of this 
nature. He contrasts these with the other end of the spectrum – chaotic – and 
suggests that projects focused on governance fall into this category. They have 
multiple pathways, many feedback loops and measurement precision is not 
straightforward. 
Whilst this classification has gained traction, it still raises a number of 
difficulties. First, whilst with so-called simple interventions, such as building 
schools or latrines, outputs are easy to define and measure, this is not to say 
that their impact is simple. Are latrines actually put to use? How does road and 
pipeline infrastructure affect land ownership? How does such infrastructure 
affect the interests of the foreign private sector and how does that impact 
local livelihoods? Does it lead to economic divisiveness, an increase of shanty 
towns, single crop farming with degradation of habitat and reduced ecological 
resilience? Can simple interventions sometimes precipitate major and systemic 
change? 
Equally, there is an interplay between the context and the intervention. Simple 
interventions in chaotic contexts will be much more difficult to evaluate than 
simple interventions in stable contexts.
So, whilst we would agree that interventions can be classified in this way, 
from the point of view of impact even the simplest actions can have complex 
effects, can interact in reflexive and complex ways with other interventions 
and with wider environmental factors. Conversely, complex interventions38 
can sometimes lead to effects which are simple to measure. The important 
question is to consider the interplay between interventions (complex or not) 
and contexts. In the work described in this report, building on (Boulton, 
2012) and (Boulton, Allen, & Bowman, 2013) we focus more on analysing 
the complexity of the context (rather than the complexity of the project) and 
gauging its relative stability as a guide as to how to engage programmatically 
and how to approach impact assessment.
1.2.2  Literature on the implications of complexity
One theme in the literature, exemplified by Patton (2011), is to emphasise 
the downside of ignoring the inevitable non-linear interconnectivity – the 
complexity – of the context in which interventions are made. His thesis is 
that in general, environments or contexts are complex and dynamic, and 
thus interventions which take place in these environments initiate multiple 
pathways. What happens as a result of a planned intervention cannot, 
therefore, be determined with any certainty in advance – and assuming that 
plans will go to plan and planned outcomes can be measured and attributed 
to actions can reduce rather than increase effectiveness and/or lead project 
teams to ‘hide’ work that is not compliant (but which responds to the context) 
or to preference funding work (such as building schools) which is easy to 
measure. 
Patton therefore argues in considering theories of intervention, it is best to 
explore possibilities, try things out, adapt in accordance with what emerges. In 
relation to impact, he emphasises that attribution is not straightforward, that 
38  Such as where a range of systemic factors are tackled together.
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what emerges can either be triggered by the intervention, or be due to other 
factors, or be due to synergies between the intervention and other factors. 
His advice, in order both to determine the impact that is emerging and to be 
able to modify interventions to deal with unintended outcomes or unexpected 
events, is to track emerging interconnections39. He suggests that 
‘causality’40  is to be understood as based on pattern detection, retrospectively 
constructed – not on trying to work out what causes what.
Patton is critical of counterfactuals, viewing them ‘as meaningless because 
of complexity…. as there are far too many variables and possibilities 
emerging and interacting dynamically’ (2010:24). He states that what needs 
to be measured can change during the evaluation as the process unfolds and 
new factors emerge and that it is important to track the forks in the road 
and implications of key decisions as innovation evolves. He emphasises that 
checking whether and how unanticipated and emergent features are dealt with 
is a fundamental function of evaluation. He advocates methods of abduction 
(inference to the best explanation) rather than deduction or induction, and 
contribution analysis rather than attribution analysis. Patton’s central thrust 
is that impact evaluation is best thought of as developmental tool, a way to 
explore why and how change happens.
Woolcock (2009:2), equally, questions how often it is valid to make the 
implicit assumption that causes and effects can be linearly and reductively 
related. He argues: ‘But it is only the most ad hoc theorising or wishful thinking 
(or the overriding imperatives of domestic political cycles and the structure of 
career paths at development organisations) that could possibly substantiate 
an assumption that all project impacts are linear and monotonic.’ He gives as 
an example of non-linearity - the j-curve – where resistance to change can 
mean that ‘things get worse before they get better’, where, if you measured 
outcomes too early you would conclude that the intervention had had a 
deleterious effect. 
Woolcock (2012) takes the example of a country establishing a new 
constitution. He argues that, on the one hand, it is possible and indeed 
straightforward to adopt a constitution from another country and regard 
the task as done. But does the constitution fit the cultural and historical and 
political context? Will it lead to good governance? Who owns it and believes 
in it? Will it change behaviour? Woolcock emphasises that development of 
governance and judicial and legal systems can take countries a long time, 
can only be achieved slowly and anticipatively and that our desire for clear 
and short-term outcomes and associated measurement can prejudice the 
undertaking of development. Instead, effective development practice and 
design needs to respond to the context, be experimental, seize opportunities, 
recognise emerging impacts, and adapt to changing circumstances. And, 
Woolcock emphasises, it needs to work with a wide range of stakeholders to 
try, in that way and ensure that the solution does reflect the relevant historical 
and cultural factors. Working participatively can also to ensure that the solution 
is ‘owned’ and hence interpretations of intentions during implementation are 
more coherent.
Complexity thinking supports the view that approaches to change and ways 
to implement will need to be sensitive to context and adapt to what emerges. 
This is not to disregard the importance of learning from other initiatives, and 
from being explicit as to how projects and programmes assume change is to 
happen. Rather it is to assess any theories of change and implementation as the 
project progresses and be prepared, explicitly and judiciously, to experiment, to 
seek contextual information and to make necessary adjustments. This ‘middle 
ground’ view is not well-developed in the literature.
1.2.3 Complexity-informed impact assessment methodologies
There is not an extensive literature in relation to actual methodologies for 
assessing impact with due regard to complexity. Some of the qualitative tools, 
reviewed by Hughes and Hutchings (2012) and White and Phillips (2012), 
start to move towards consideration of complexity, as discussed below.
Process tracing and contribution analysis
In particular, process tracing (Hughes and Hutchings 2012), seeks evidence 
for the chain of events that produce or contribute to a particular effect or 
outcome. This requires ‘consider[ation of] alternative, competing explanations 
for the observed outcome in question until the explanations most supported 
by the data remain’. White and Phillips (2012) explain that the approach draws 
largely on qualitative data including historical reports, interviews and any 
available quantitative data to develop an explicit chronology of actual events, 
setting out the causal links between each stage. While adding time, there is 
still an implicit assumption of linear causality – that one thing can be deemed 
to cause another.41  
While these approaches pay more attention to context than other methods do, 
they still lack a systematic approach to dealing with external validity42  and still 
assume stability within the context and assume that a theory of change can 
be designed, articulated and can indeed be implemented as intended. There 
is the possibility, however, that some of these methods could be adapted to 
39 And this approach – tracking emerging connections – is what underpins our approach.
40 Causality, in the physical sciences, has a very strict meaning and is used only to describe situations 
where a given input leads inexorably to a given output in a way that is predictable, independent of 
other factors and linear. The term ‘causality’ is used in this report in a weaker way to suggest strong 
evidence that (a) contributes to (b).
41  Hutchings (2012a), though, has been experimenting with comparisons with ‘actual’ rather than 
‘espoused’ theories of change. In other words the project team are asked what were their own 
intentions in undertaking certain aspects of work and then the actual work was compared with their 
‘local’ theory of change.
41  That is to say, complexity theory in emphasising uniqueness of context would argue that, because 
something works here is not sufficient evidence to suggest it would work ‘there’ – even if ‘there’ has 
seemingly similar qualities to ‘here’.
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be less predicated on a theory of change. They could represent a theory of 
change as something that can adapt to changing circumstances and that 
may be context specific. They could indeed, have the notions of adaptation 
and experimentation as the theory of change. The approach in this report, 
described in sections 3 and 4, seeks to trace the story of what did happen, but 
in an open-ended way, free of a theory of change.
The literature on narrative
Another body of work that is relevant to complexity thinking is the literature on 
the use of narrative as a qualitative research tool. Boje (Luhman & Boje, 2001) 
and Snowden (2002) and Byrne43), have both considered how narratives of 
events and projects can be used to capture complex dynamics. Snowden (see 
www.cognitive-edge.com) has developed software methodologies that allow 
analysis of ‘narrative fragments’. The method is designed to work in the field, 
to allow respondents to tell stories and elements of stories and themselves 
work together to agree themes that represent and classify what these narrative 
fragments imply.
Stories people tell can indicate what people see as important, how they have 
made sense of events, what is the prevailing discourse and culture. Some 
qualitative researchers focus on collecting and analysing such collections of 
stories. Some researchers feel that such stories need to be ‘complete’, to have 
a sort of integrity, a beginning, middle and end. Other researchers collect 
fragments of narrative, capture fragments of conversation and would argue 
(for example, Georgakopoulou (2010)) that insisting on more complete 
stories prejudices the selection of accounts – preferences the stories  of the 
more articulate, or preferences older, more well-established accounts which 
have been tidied up and embellished. Fragments of narrative, Georgakopoulou 
argues, are more immediate, more authentic and are less prone to bias in 
selection.
Clandinin and Connelly (2000:17) say:
‘If we understand the world narratively, as we do, then it makes sense to study 
the world narratively. For us, life…is filled with narrative fragments, enacted 
in storied moments of time and space’.
The collection and analysis of narrative fragments formed the basis for our 
piloted process of identifying emerging impact pathways, as described in 
sections 3 and 4. The work described here only included one ‘pass’ at this 
process. To capture emerging trends would require more than one ‘pass’ spaced 
out over time, so it is possible to see whether emerging trends do indeed 
emerge, how they interact and what else happens that supports or hinders 
this.
1.2.4  Discussion – implications of complexity 
Complexity has to be contrasted with a view of the world as machine-like. A 
machine-like view underpins most programming and evaluation processes. It 
suggests causes are additive not synergistic; that change is incremental and 
predictable; that outcomes can be mapped onto causes in a linear relationship; 
that change processes, once optimised can be standardised across a range of 
contexts. Complexity perspectives emphasise that this linear notion of causality 
and predictability is appropriate only in particularly stable contexts and in 
general to assume it is misleading and leads to unhelpful change processes 
and to erroneous methods of evaluation and impact assessment. 
This affects the way implementation is approached. It legitimises a responsive, 
context-sensitive, flexible programming approach and strongly questions 
whether a theory of change can be fixed at the outset or is appropriate for 
all contexts. 
Complexity thinking emphasises the path-dependent connections between 
the theory of implementation (how best to do the project) and the theory of 
change (the theory that defines how the project is designed to change the 
environment and with what intended outcome).  The implementation phase 
shapes the impact phases and cannot entirely be separated from them so that 
discussion of impact inevitably has to return to the process of implementation, 
and seek to explore the pathway(s) followed.
When it comes to assessing impact, complexity thinking questions the 
efficacy and validity of defining a baseline. Even if a baseline can be defined, 
due to the time delay between inputs and outcomes, there is no way to be 
sure that subsequent changes in relation to the baseline were not caused by 
interventions which happened or were initiated before the baseline (rather 
than being caused by the intervention of interest).  Moreover, impact pathways 
may emerge during the project – or indeed after the project is completed. And 
emergent impact pathways may interact with the intended impact pathway – 
impact pathways are not additive. So indicators determined at the beginning 
of a project may be insufficient to capture and track such emergent pathways. 
These pathways are not necessarily competing theories of change (although 
they may be) but components of a broader theory of change as they relate to 
the way in which this intervention sets off interactions within its environment 
– and how these develop are may be instrumental to the success or failure 
of the project and its core intended impact.  Further, sometimes even the 
most important aspects of change may occur sometime after the project is 
completed, hence a need for impact assessment and monitoring to continue 
to some degree after the project is completed.
42   Byrne, in a  (Feb 2011) book proposal on complexity and social science says ‘It will argue for a 
concentration on narratives since what is of interest to us is all of the past history, current condition 
and future potential of complex systems and any description of these has to be understood in narrative 
terms’.
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This means that that evaluation is most effective when it is purposefully 
integrated into the project and programme from the outset. Indeed it is in the 
interests of projects to collect qualitative data on emergent features or signs 
of change as this can point to where more quantitative measures would be 
of value and where this can give evidence with which to seek further funding.
Complexity thinking thus questions the notion of attribution and instead 
points us towards analysing contribution. At a meta-level, complexity theory 
changes the theory of change. For example, if change is episodic, with periods 
where little tangible seems to change and moments where change can be very 
significant, this affects notions of contribution. There may be a tendency to 
over-emphasise the importance of the ‘critical juncture’ or ‘tipping point’ whilst 
under-emphasising the contribution to change of persisting and moving 
slowly forwards when there is little to show – but where this persistence got 
the situation to the point where tipping was possible.
Analysing contribution requires a degree of subjective consideration – no 
contribution is entirely separated from any other contribution.  Since it is always 
a matter of judgement, it is important to consider from the outset who are the 
stakeholders and who engages in these judgements.  Also, whilst in one sense 
everything and anything may be the trigger for change, not everything can be 
monitored. What is monitored is in part dependent on the vision and intentions 
of the programme and how these may change during the programme as 
evidence and new factors emerge. So, again, clarity is needed on who decides 
on these issues dynamically.   This is not to suggest that complexity thinking 
questions the importance of evidence; rather it accepts that not all evidence 
is objective or quantitatively measurable.  Moreover, it underlines that this 
relates to the power and politics of implementation rather than seeing the 
actors as in some way external to the theory of change.
Finally, it reminds us that even if we can demonstrate that a project or 
programme has had impact in one place, it is no guarantee it will have the 
same impact in another place (external validity). It also stresses the interaction 
between different scales of activity: micro, meso and macro.  It is important 
not to reify levels and operate as if change can be understood as the interaction 
of patterns at one level (e.g. supply and demand curves). Qualitative change 
– that is, change which results in new features (development) rather than 
quantitative change (growth) which results in more of the same - cannot be 
understood by looking at the dynamics of relationships in one level alone. 
Indeed change to higher-level patterns is almost always impacted by the 
micro. So to understand the dynamics of change does require diving down 
into the detail at different analytical levels, in particular at critical junctures.
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This annex contains a more detailed version of parts of the discussion in the 
text - in particular that using secondary data sources.  
2.1  ACHIEVING OUTCOMES AND DIRECT IMPACT THROUGH 
GROUP LEVEL SUSTAINABILITY
It is clear from the secondary studies that there is “enormous institutional 
diversity” (DAI, 2010, p. 34) and experience of both group flourishing and 
failure.  This next two sections use the available secondary evidence and 
material from our field interviews to illustrate how a complexity lens makes 
sense of this. The studies available deal with different projects (primarily 
COSAMO and COSALO1 with some evidence from SILC); they address different 
questions (group sustainability; individual impact; meso level impact) and use 
different sampling approaches and research methods (ethnographic; semi-
structured qualitative interviews; focus group discussions; sample survey). 
This is not therefore either an exhaustive account of outcomes and impact but 
seeks to use this evidence to illustrate the underlying issues. Indeed it is not 
clear from the studies available what conclusions can in fact be drawn from 
this material – this is in itself of interest since it demonstrates a significant 
diversity of performance on which a complexity lens sheds light.  The purpose 
in using this evidence here is not to make a judgement of whether this does 
or does not suggest that SGs are on balance a success or a failure.  Such a 
judgement must be made against a set of criteria and a complexity lens is, 
in itself, agnostic about what these criteria are. Rather it points out that those 
criteria are determined by particular conditions (social, political, organisational, 
institutional etc.) and do not capture a complete picture, especially since they 
will be applied at a point in time.  Indeed something that is regarded as a ‘failure’ 
at a particular point in time may then turn into a ‘success’ at another point in 
time or vice versa.44 Rather if the issue is to understand the heterogeneity of 
outcomes and results across, space, time, social context and so on it is useful 
to analyse how this arises. 
Past histories made it difficult to establish SGs in some parts of Western Kenya, 
such as Vihiga, as earlier pyramid schemes had undermined trust in savings 
institutions.  Since some of these schemes had been sponsored by churches, 
working with FBOs to start SGs was a particular problem.  Moreover, Odell 
and Rippey (2010) indicate that slightly over a half of the groups that they 
researched had a prior existence as a group in the form of a ROSCA, ASCA, CBO, 
welfare or self-help group or business.  This highlights that the SG intervention 
may be one period in the life of the group rather than its start.  They point 
out that it is necessary to ask whether the SG methodology might have 
undermined the sustainability of a pre-existing group.  Indeed there is a much 
deeper path dependent relationship between SGs and a number of social and 
cultural institutions, and historical influences.  The development of self-help 
extends back to the colonial period in which, for example, land terracing 
was undertaken with forcible sanctions and the movement of Harambee 
(self-help) since independence in the 1980s.  The colonial government also 
promoted the formation of women’s ROSCAs as a means of enabling them 
to have access to small sums of money, and these in turn also can be seen as 
based in the formation of labour groups among women. The relatively more 
limited operation of men in groups also has a socio-cultural history (Johnson, 
2004).  
SGs offer particular synergies with their context.  For example, DAI (2010) 
points out that the share outs are usually timed to converge with the financially 
most demanding times of year (December – Christmas; February – school 
fees, planting; June – planting). The terminating ASCA approach of SGs solves 
a key problem that exists with ROSCAs and non-terminating ASCAs in that the 
share out enables all members to have a lump sum at a specific point in time. 
This is otherwise a reason why ROSCAs and non-terminating ASCAs can fail to 
serve people’s needs as they cannot deal with covariant demand.  
Nevertheless, the studies highlight the role of context in relation to performance 
reporting varied group sustainability across geographical locations. There are 
signals that group performance in Rachuonyo may be stronger than in other 
districts which raises further questions about context (Malkamaki, 2013; 
M. Odell & Rippey, 2010).  A study of the meso-level impacts of savings 
groups (FSD/COADY 2012) does find that the agro-ecological context and 
the economic activities that arise as a result affect performance. In coffee and 
cashew-nut growing areas (eg. Malanga), SG loans were used to diversify 
economic sources. In tea growing areas in Nyamira, however, there was 
some evidence that SG loans were ultimately having a detrimental effect on 
household incomes and production systems, by encouraging short-term sales 
to ‘soko huru’ traders rather than KTDA factories. 
Odell and Rippey also document how about a 1/3 of groups have linked to 
NGO and related programmes of various types.  This is unsurprising since 
many NGOs are looking for groups to work with. However, it underlines 
that the presence of opportunities to access NGO benefits may be both a 
motive for formation as well as a contributory factor to sustainability (see 
also Malkamaki, 2012).  Additionally, operating as groups, SGs may wish to 
develop past activities or initiate new ones collectively to support themselves 
or others.  There is evidence of both economic and social projects either in 
the form of income generation activities (e.g. renting out group assets such as 
chairs); mutual assistance in the form of social support or insurance; projects 
to assist children in the community with school fees being undertaken by 1/3 
of these groups. This illustrates how synergy arises as well as the possibility 
that when groups have mobilised resources there are expectations from others 
for support.  
Annex 2
CASE STUDY - SAVINGS GROUPS
43  An example in the microfinance field in Kenya is either (i) Equity Building Society whose failure and 
virtual insolvency in itself set in place the conditions under which it was necessary for it to transform 
itself; or (ii) along similar lines the withdrawal of external funding from Partnership for Productivity in 
the 1980s which resulted in the managed ASCA model evolving in Central Province and developing a 
model with outreach to over 20,000 (Mule et al., 2002).  Or  the example of the Western financial crisis 
in 2008, that a booming banking sector– given time proved to be a source of failure for the sector as a 
whole – indeed part of a long history of cycles in this sector (find ref). 
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The SG methodology is designed to address the need to gain access to and 
manage financial resources in the context of uncertain livelihoods.  It does this 
not only by creating a savings and loan fund within the group, but also through 
its ability to connect people to resources and processes beyond the group. It 
does this within a socio-cultural context which may be both a strength and 
a weakness: the long experience of group operations and self-help, and the 
political connections of groups have an impact on their success and failure. 
This illustrates how the sustainability of SGs is affected by the underlying 
features of a complex world.  Many of these issues form the subject matter of 
social, political and economic analyses. The perspective added by complexity 
theory is the dimension of time; in particular how policies and interventions 
are affected by time and, as a result, produce synergies and interactions.    
2.2  THE DYNAMICS OF IMPACT AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
This section reviews the evidence available on the impact of SGs at the 
individual level from a complexity perspective. The evidence from the DAI 
impact assessment study suggests that members were most concerned with 
the use of small scale loans available from SGs to enable them to manage their 
income generating livelihood activities both on and off farm (DAI, 2010).  This 
contributes to the diversification of income generation streams which in turn 
lead to consumption smoothing.45  Investment opportunities differ depending 
on the local economy (e.g. tea/coffee/cashew nut – see above) demonstrating 
the importance of synergy as well as context specificity.   Loans which enable 
small enterprises can contribute to reduced dependence on poorly paid casual 
labour and allow women to undertake businesses that better fit with their 
domestic activities. While these contribute to income stability, given their 
small scale these activities do not necessarily produce new public market 
spaces for women (i.e. because of context-specific gender relations and 
gendered market development) and hence support (Meso-level study). 
The SG pay-outs directly assist consumption smoothing and are also used for 
school fee payments and health emergencies. The availability of loans through 
this route can reduce the frequency of sale of small scale assets to cope with 
such eventualities. Availability of finance is also contributing to choices to 
upgrade schools for children as well as ability to reduce the time children 
might be “sent” (i.e. sent home) for school fees – that is, access to lump sums 
enable households to meet the demand for higher quality education. Share-
outs are timed to meet particular financial needs - particularly school fees, 
planting and Christmas (DAI, 2010) . 
The ability of women to contribute to household expenditure through small 
enterprises contributes to a sense of greater independence among women 
and it is perceived that “they don’t waste anymore” (meso study p23) or are 
no longer seen as idle.  The SGs fit with a local social context in which there 
is a “strong ideology” of groups.  This also draws from past interventions that 
have worked with groups and which give rise to an ideology of ‘busy women” 
(Elliott, 2012) whose commitment to development is expressed through 
group membership. In the case of SILC, groups have enabled women to create 
a new layer of leadership and local authority which is politically active - hence 
the opportunities provided by SG leadership are synergistic with the way local 
authority and leadership operates presenting an emergent impact.  SG leaders 
also advise others on entrepreneurship and hard work.  However, this discourse 
tends to screen out the role of men and stereotypes their irresponsibility which 
belies the reality of men’s contributions to women’s participation in SGs and 
the ways in which these new sources of capital synergise with household 
economies. 
Membership of SGs is most easily taken up by the “middle poor” (DAI, 2010), 
Meso-level Impact study (forthcoming))  who have the social and economic, 
assets and skills to operate in social networks (i.e. the groups) contribute 
financially and manage group-based sources of capital (context and synergy 
with individual’s socio-economic circumstances).  Nevertheless, the GSL 
segment is more likely to be female with larger households and poorer than 
the average (DAI, 2010). 
SGs create both competition and complementarity with other services 
(synergy).  For some, membership creates credit worthiness in other 
institutions such as shops or schools.  SGs are competitive with other MFIs 
and even banks, reducing the demand for their products and services (see also 
Annex 3 and Johnson et al. 2010).  At the same time, they provide attractive 
new markets for formal financial institutions (Odell and Rippey, 2010). This 
is actively facilitated in some cases by SG programmes which work with 
formal providers to provide appropriate products to link with SGs and their 
members.   
Finally, the creation of social funds in groups also enables management of 
emergencies.  (Meso study, forthcoming).  This provision of social support also 
creates social solidarity and mutual commitment (DAI, 2010) – which also fits 
with past experiences of welfare and self-help groups which are endemic to 
the local social context, past interventions and history. 
This evidence illustrates the various ways in which the methodology of SGs 
and its results interact with existing features of the local social, economic and 
political context, including the way in which past interventions have worked 
with and consolidated group-based approaches to development.  It illustrates 
how these are part of a system and how they therefore operate synergistically 
with these contexts.  It is not possible to demonstrate from this evidence the 
episodic nature of change or how particular events synergise to enable change 
to happen (or not) since the studies available do not have a perspective on 
time in relation to processes of change.  
45  Of course, if the economic environment did not support small scale business this would not be so 
possible.
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2.3  INTERCONNECTING AND EMERGING IMPACT PATHWAYS 
This section demonstrates more broadly how the impact pathways of the SG 
project are interconnected and changing such that additional pathways also 
emerge. The core impact pathway hypothesised by the project as its theory 
of change is focused on the creation of groups to deliver appropriate financial 
services.  It then looks at the impact of these services on individual’s ability to 
improve incomes and reduce their vulnerability primarily through consumption 
smoothing. Studies so far have produced evidence of these effects, as indicated 
above. In this section, we use the evidence across the three levels (project, 
group, and household) and stages of the results chain (outputs, outcomes and 
impact) to identify other avenues through which impact is occurring.  Evidence 
is also used to show how these  other pathways interact with one another to 
synergistically disturb or reinforce this impact.  The analysis raises issues about 
how we understand the heterogeneity of impact as well as raising issues for 
the sustainability of impact at all levels.  
Financial inclusion and group replication: there is considerable 
evidence of the self-replication of the methodology (FSD Kenya, 2012; M. 
Odell & Rippey, 2010).  This demand is most likely driven by the demand for 
small scale loans as evidence from other studies (including in relation to SGs) 
demonstrates (Johnson et al., 2012).  So far the evidence on the sustainability 
of self-replicated groups is limited. Malkamaki (2010) finds no difference in 
the performance of project trained and self-replicating groups.  Given the 
diversity of groups already in existence and motives for forming them, the 
factors leading to their potential sustainability are similarly complex (in the 
sense that term is used here). However, these factors clearly create the potential 
for both positive and negative feedback loops.  Positive reinforcement of the 
value of the methodology where groups perform well emerge with negative 
reinforcement where they do not.  Where groups perform poorly or fail there 
is the potential for SGs to gain a negative reputation and to create a risk to 
the system as a whole: poor performance leads to weak replications, and (like 
pyramid schemes) SGs becomes labelled with the risk of loss of savings.  
Economic development: the evidence highlights the aspirations of 
individuals and groups with regard to the development of income generating 
opportunities. As access to small scale capital expands, so investment 
opportunities are subject to greater pressure. There is potential for market 
saturation since women (and other marginalised groups such as young 
people) tend to enter enterprise sectors where there are low barriers to entry. 
This constrains their ability to develop their income earning activities.  This 
is especially the case when the economy as a whole is not dynamic.  In this 
situation these enterprises are particularly saturated and business operators 
may be stuck in these and unable to move into new sectors and niches.  The 
related issue is whether those with small amounts of capital are equipped with 
the relevant skills, networks, connections to markets and so on to take up such 
opportunities.  The wider context of how economies operate and are changing 
is also therefore important for SG sustainability.  Interviews in the field-work 
for this study suggested that some group members were indeed taking up new 
business opportunities, indicating the potential to support these pathways to 
impact both at individual and collective levels.  
Collective action: some groups also sought to operate as collectives to 
promote their individual enterprises. This raises the question of how links to 
the support they need can be more systematically made and their capacity 
to manage collaborative activities developed.46 There are also movements 
towards clustering of SGs, mechanisms for them to operate collectively or 
form SACCOs are related to the question of economic development as they 
highlight desires for resource mobilisation and development which is locally 
owned.  This is something that holds the potential for strong impacts for some 
who are able to achieve it effectively but holds the risks of failure so often seen 
in such ventures in the past. 
Financial sector development and linkages: the evidence also highlights 
the question of how SGs and their members interact with third party financial 
service providers.  While some find their services more appealing than those of 
banks, the independence of SGs as financial service providers is by no means 
assured.  Indeed they present a ready-made set of groups for the financial 
sector which increasingly wants to link to them. The question then arises as 
to what is needed to ensure this happens in the most effective way, as there 
is clearly a range of potential downside risks here that could undermine SGs.  
Financial capabilities:  there is evidence that SGs work well to support 
improvements in money management skills and the discipline of savings.  This 
raises questions about whether and how there might be efforts to increase 
impact through the development of these capabilities.  However, SGs can also 
be understood as supporting a culture of borrowing which offers challenges 
for capability development in terms of risks of multiple-membership and the 
need for juggling of debts which may not ultimately be welfare enhancing. 
Social development:  there is considerable evidence in existing  studies 
of the importance of SGs in building social solidarity and social support 
mechanisms (DAI, 2010; M. Odell & Rippey, 2010), as well as support to 
women’s increased autonomy and voice.  They also ensure this support has 
a financial dimension through social funds, resulting in welfare enhancing 
impacts as well as material impacts on vulnerability.  Social funds operating 
as insurance mechanisms, are dimensions of financial inclusion which are not 
given sufficient attention in impact assessments of SGs. 
Group dynamics and local power relations:  both the internal workings 
of groups and their connections to wider social structures and power relations 
46  There is a range of ways in which collective activities can take place which do not necessarily require 
the joint ownership of the enterprise itself or productive assets which, in the past, have been found 
to be very difficult for groups to effectively manage (e.g. posho mills).  But collective activities such 
as joint buying/selling of inputs/outputs, organisation of access to markets and so on which support 
individual enterprises, are much more feasible.  
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are important to their survival and success. Malkamaki (2013) shows how 
these dynamics interact with local power relations, in which respect variations 
in delivery channels and social structures of groups produce heterogeneous 
outcomes.    During our field work it was observed and reported by CARE 
staff that more men seemed to be taking on prominent roles in groups and 
clusters.  It remains to be seen whether these trends are likely to support the 
development of the groups or create new challenges, since men have tended 
to find it difficult to participate in group-based finance in the past.  
Political dynamics: the existence of groups as a forum for local politics also 
operates as both strength and weakness.   There was evidence from our field 
work that groups are helpful to local administrations in their ability to mobilise 
people for barazas or other local events. (This a particular feature of the 
current election campaigns, also making it desirable to be a group member.) 
These engagements offer the scope to increase the voice of SG members in 
relation to local administrations and politicians, creating an alternative impact 
pathway to reduced poverty through the effects of political linkage on resource 
mobilisation and accountability for public service delivery. At the same time 
the incentive to join groups to gain access to external resources can undermine 
the core foundations for SG success, which rests on financial independence. 
This discussion highlights the fact that once the “model” is devised it will interact 
with its environment in dynamic ways.  As outreach grows new challenges are 
created, necessitating new responses to avoid negative feedback loops while 
continuing to strengthen positive interactions and impacts.  
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3.1  WORKING PROSPECTIVELY
3.1.1  Workshop feedback
The ideas of the report were presented to FSD’s theme heads at an internal 
workshop on 1st February, 2013.  This produced a lively discussion in 
which the ideas appeared to have substantial relevance for experiences of 
implementation and for the understanding of outcome and impact trends.  
Theme leads were asked to discuss: 
   Critical moments47  at which the project significantly moved forward and 
in this context what were the ways in which (i) the project had built the 
ground for this shift and (ii) what else had happened beyond the project 
that enabled the shift to occur.
   Looking forwards to achieving the project goal – to identify what 
is starting to happen or might happen that will help or hinder its 
achievement? 
These exercises immediately resonated with project managers who identified 
critical moments and what had been happening to shift the ground by 
the project itself and in the wider environment.  For the second exercise, a 
brainstorming of factors that might help or hinder the project was mapped 
via post-it notes against the core causal chain of the project. This provoked 
an enthusiastic response as to the usefulness of this type of exercise for 
thinking through the evolving scenarios in which projects find themselves 
operating.  While such factors are to an extent addressed as risks and linkages 
in project appraisal documents, they are not systematically revisited in project 
implementation in ways that are relevant for on-going management.  In this 
respect, the consideration of the wider environment and factors justifying 
decisions to adjust course as projects evolve are not documented and captured 
in ways that evaluators or impact assessors can review.  This vividly highlighted 
the disjuncture between models of planning and reporting which focus on a 
linear results chain, and the reality of implementation and impact in which 
projects are constantly responding to an evolving set of concerns. 
Examples that came out of the discussion were:
   Financial Education and Capabilities – work on this area is proving 
difficult to conceptualise and move forward because thinking is still 
evolving and is therefore unstable.  Decisions about what kind of 
strategy to implement in Kenya are therefore not easy to arrive at. 
However, there has been a strong basis of stakeholder collaboration 
and readiness to move forward with implementation.  As the theme 
lead put it, his “nightmare” is that in three years’ time the project will be 
evaluated against a set of global good practice and understanding which 
is different to the current thinking that is informing the project design. 
This suggests a stage at which conceptualising the field of work is itself 
chaotic and regularities in approaches and theories are themselves not 
yet clear. FSD is therefore engaged in trying to learn about what works 
and must recognise the risks involved and consequent implications for 
performance.  It suggests the need to plan its own programmes in ways 
that can respond to its own emerging learning of what works and why 
and how it is working in the Kenyan context.  
   Building capacity for the financial sector to serve SMEs (GrowthCap) – 
this project has been delayed by some two years due to difficulties in 
recruiting a suitable project manager.  In this period the level of interest 
and understanding in the financial sector with respect to SME lending 
has shifted considerably with many banks now having strategies in place. 
This means that the portfolio of activities can now shift from a “push” to 
a “pull” approach.  The landscape has also shifted as understanding from 
other FSD projects has filtered through.  For example, the availability of 
credit reference reports has raised issues about whether the banks are 
using these appropriately in lending decisions tending to be used to 
produce a simple yes or no decision rather than used to develop risk-
based pricing.  
   The Financial Services Associations (FSA) project has persisted over many 
years to develop a model that could serve people in remote and poor rural 
areas with flexible and appropriate financial services.  At a point where 
it is finally moving towards sustainability two wider factors can impact 
on it in completely opposite ways.  The shift to County level government 
may offer new opportunities for the growth and development of FSAs 
in an environment which values local institutions.  In the meantime 
on the other hand, the new development of M-Shwari (and its further 
evolution) may completely undermine their perceived value and the 
market for their services.   
These examples demonstrate that FSD is operating in a sector that is undergoing 
rapid change in terms of concepts as well as in practice.  It is doing so as the 
effects of policy and regulatory changes, together with competitive pressures 
to capture business ramify through the market.  They also clearly demonstrate 
that the issues of attribution and contribution of impact to FSD are difficult to 
conceptualise and assess. 
This session ended with some discussion of what might be feasible approaches 
to incorporating this understanding into project management systems.  Two 
approaches were considered.
First, the newly introduced system of monthly project steering committee 
meetings was thought to be an appropriate forum within which this kind of 
reflection and scoping of wider factors affecting the project’s progress could 
be embedded.  To make this most useful it would also need to be captured in a 
record of the meeting.  The maps that started to be developed in the workshop 
of wider factors and events contributing to, or constraining the achievement 
Annex 3
COMPLEXITY INFORMED IMPACT ASSESSMENT – 
PROPOSED APPROACHES 
47 Also referred to as critical junctures.
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of outcomes and impact could be a tool that was reviewed at the start of each 
meeting as a means of orienting the discussion of project issues.  The ‘map’ 
could be reviewed and augmented for 15 minutes at the start of a meeting. 
This could help ensure that agenda items which deal with particular issues 
in project implementation are discussed within the frame of achieving the 
project goal.
Suggested questions to focus the discussion would be:
1.  Wider factors that influence the achievement of outcomes and impact:
 ¶  How have the factors that we have already identified as helping or 
hindering the project’s outcomes and impact changed?  What are 
the potential consequences for outcomes and impact? 
 ¶  What new factors are evident that may help or hinder the projects 
outcomes and impact?  What evidence should we monitor to track 
the evolution of these factors over the coming months?  (e.g. 
checking out through asking people informally before the next 
meeting; or more formally through a specific initiative to collect 
some data).
2. Evidence and signals of outcomes and impacts:
 ¶  What signs are emerging of the outcomes and impacts that we 
planned for?  Are these being effectively captured through our 
existing indicator reporting?  How can we improve this?
 ¶  What signs of outcomes or impact are emerging that we did not 
plan for – either positive or negative? What information do we 
need to capture these and to check out and monitor how important 
they are? 
3. Connections
 ¶  How are these emerging signs connected, how do these impact 
pathways - whether existing or emerging - support or undermine 
each other and the core impact pathway(s)?
Capturing these factors and noting them down in the minutes of the meeting 
means that they can be reviewed again for further developments at the start 
of the following meeting. 
Second, a new project tracking format is being devised.  This first involves 
theme leads identifying the theory of change of each project along with key 
research questions and possible qualitative and quantitative indicators.  Then 
reviewing existing data sources and working with partners to track them on 
a regular basis.  This will be stored in a programme database which will then 
be used to produce an annual impact report for each project and theme which 
can be reviewed by project managers and disseminated to stakeholders and 
funders.  This could also be adapted to have sections on the factors that are 
contributing to the outcomes and impact of the project and those that are 
constraining it, answering the same questions as above.  If adopted together 
with the project steering committee meeting it could act as a periodic and 
more formalised summary of the key issues that arose from the steering 
committee meetings with the indicators and evidence/indications which were 
collected also summarised.  
Together these would offer a much richer body of evidence that would 
provide:
(i) A record of factors that led to the management decisions made.
(ii) A dynamic understanding of the evolving environment, events and factors 
that were either helping or hindering the project’s progress towards its 
goal as well as frequent review of indicators that assess to what extent 
these goals are being achieved and whether  other unplanned impacts 
are emerging.
These records would then provide a key resource to be given to evaluators and 
reviewers in undertaking Mid-Term Reviews, Project Completion Reports, end 
of project evaluations and impact assessments.  Undertaking reviews of the 
project along the lines proposed in the methodology laid out above, offers 
evaluators a wider range of pathways within which to explore the role of 
the project.  It offers the potential for a stronger understanding of the way 
in which building the ground has taken place and the factors that may have 
been detracting from this.  For example, had GrowthCap in fact started two 
years ago and had to engage in more of a “push” approach to building financial 
capacity for the SME  sector, the project might have encountered a range of 
negative forces which this type of impact monitoring exercise would have 
helped to identify.  That is, when projects encounter frequent setbacks because 
they are operating in an area where the conditions are not conducive they 
may not succeed in achieving their goals but their overall contribution might 
be underestimated when viewed retrospectively.  Similarly for an evaluator 
to understand the contribution of a particular project at a stage where the 
financial sector is more pre-disposed towards engaging with aims and 
objectives of the project, the evaluator should not over-attribute change to 
the project.  Nevertheless, the ways in which the project effectively builds on 
existing dynamics can be assessed as strength.  
3.1.2  Ways forward:  piloting at project level 
Given that there are the above potential ways to integrate a complexity 
approach into FSD’s management systems, it would be appropriate to pilot the 
approach outlined above within one or two projects to see how it can work - 
especially given that projects are of quite different characters. 
Prior to undertaking the steps proposed above it would be useful to review the 
project’s causal pathway. This could proceed through the following steps:
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1. Review and revise existing impact pathways and 
related indicators:
a. Review the core impact pathways laid out in project documents 
and revise if necessary to ensure these reflect the current best 
understanding of the planned results chain.  Document any 
improved understanding of linkages and assumptions that has 
been gained from experience to date. 
b. Review the indicators that are attached to different points 
in the causal pathway for their relevance and usefulness. 
Propose and consider how to collect other indicators that are 
now understood to be relevant.  Collect and review the actual 
indicators.  If they cannot be collected without undue expense 
then consider what might be more appropriate, timely and 
useful to collect. 
2. Expand the view through undertaking the three step 
review process:
a. Wider factors that influence the achievement of outcomes and 
impact:
i. How have the factors that we have already identified as 
helping or hindering the project’s outcomes and impact 
changed?  What are the potential consequences for 
outcomes and impact? 
ii. What new factors are evident that may help or hinder 
the projects outcomes and impact?  What evidence 
should we monitor to track the evolution of these factors 
over the coming months?  (e.g. checking out through 
asking people informally before the next meeting; or 
more formally through a specific initiative to collect 
some data).
b. Evidence and signals of outcomes and impacts:
i. What signs are emerging of the outcomes and impacts 
that we planned for?  Are these being effectively 
captured through our existing indicator reporting?  How 
can we improve this?
ii. What signs of outcomes or impact are emerging that 
we did not plan for – either positive or negative? What 
information do we need to capture these and to check 
out and monitor how important they are? 
c. Connections
i. How are these emerging signs connected, how do these 
impact pathways - whether existing or emerging - 
support or undermine each other and the core impact 
pathway(s)?
3. Collect data: decide what data / information needs to be 
collected on the wider related and emerging impact pathways:  
a. What information would better contextualise and explain the 
project’s outcomes and the way wider factors are helping/
hindering these?  
For example, for the credit reference project relevant data may be:
i. Sector PAR levels which have increased (Business Daily, 
30th January 2013) because there are wider influences 
on this figure despite individual banks using credit 
reports to stop lending to problem borrowers and being 
able to use the threat of reporting to improve collections. 
Key indicators which capture these fluctuations are 
available from the CBK or the newspapers and the latter 
are also capturing on-going analysis of the relationships 
and trends at work.  
ii. Similarly, information on trends in lending is relevant. 
Such as new pressures to lend (e.g. due to an improved 
government fiscal position), new products and how 
these are affecting the environment for lending to 
SMEs and consumers. These are relevant to the way 
in which CIS impacts on the portfolio, methods of 
risk-based pricing and so on.   These can be captured 
through tracking sector level developments through the 
newspapers and related analyses by the CBK. 
iii. Wider public awareness of credit information sharing 
can be tracked through newspaper articles on 
blacklisting and cases in court.  Shifting coverage of 
positive information sharing among the public could 
therefore be seen through this discussion.  
b. Put in place responsibilities for collection of this 
information and reporting at the Steering Committee 
Meeting or through the new project reporting format. 
 
Box A1: A proposed approach to reviewing, expanding and monitoring impact pathways
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Such an approach could be undertaken not just within FSD management 
structures but with project partners in project review meetings.
It is evident from discussions with FSD managers that it is this type of dynamic 
reviewing and constant re-consideration that is happening in FSD in informal 
ways. The purpose here then is to find ways to systematise it in management 
processes and capture it in documentation in order to make it more transparent 
to staff, management, evaluators and funders.  
3.1.3  Implications for FSD programme level management
Theme heads were also concerned in the workshop that the interactions 
between projects and the conditions and issues they are encountering tend to 
be missed and not sufficiently discussed. The above proposed approach offers a 
means to identify these synergies and interactions. This could be done through 
a similar review process at the beginning of senior management meetings. 
It would involve a review of the project level factors that interact with other 
project pathways. A similar process could be undertaken for reviewing these 
driven by similar questions as at the project level.  
1.  Wider factors that influence the achievement of outcomes and impact:
   What are the factors that are affecting the achievement of the 
outcomes and impact of the FSD programme as a whole?  These 
are core to the issue laid out in the Strategy document of achieving 
different scenarios of cash lite or lock-in to a low- level development 
trajectory.
   What are the factors that are affecting the achievement of outcomes 
and impact across more than one project?  What are the ways in 
which outcomes are interacting between projects?
2.  Evidence and signals of outcomes and impacts:
   What signs are emerging of the outcomes and impacts that we 
planned for?  Are these being effectively captured through our 
existing indicator reporting?  
   What signs of outcomes or impact are emerging that we did not 
plan for – either positive or negative? What information do we 
need to capture these to check out and monitor how important 
they are? 
   How are these interacting and connected across projects in the 
portfolio and for the programme as a whole? 
These dynamics could also then be summarised into quarterly reporting at 
the programme level to FSD’s donors in the quarterly and annual reports. 
This would give a more dynamic view of the way in which FSD is managing a 
portfolio of activities in a dynamic environment.  
The workshop focussed on finding the relevance of complexity ideas for on-
going management and for how this facilitates capturing the dynamics behind 
outcomes and impact.  As discussed above, many FSD projects do focus on 
systemic change or work with a relatively small number of players, and hence 
many are not suited to more conventional approaches to impact assessment 
that deal with “large n” scenarios.  The approach outlined above is a means 
of operationalizing management systems within a dynamic evaluation for 
4. Review and decide: once the data is becoming available, 
review the evidence and signals of outcomes and impacts against 
this data (step 2 of the steering committee meeting above):
a. Discuss what this means for the project’s impact pathway and 
goal.   What does it mean or suggest should be done differently 
to achieve the goal?  In what ways can a positive emerging 
impact be built on.  [E.g. how could the use of credit reports 
to screen public officials be built on in the public awareness 
campaign?]
b. Decide whether a decision can be made or whether more 
information is needed and how to get it and keep it under 
review.48   
c. Monitor to assess whether this impact or pathway is growing 
or subsiding, or fluctuating in a way that needs on-going 
monitoring.  Consider how you can assess whether this 
represents an issue of growing concern or importance or has 
subsided and is no longer relevant and further tracking is 
not needed.  How is it changing key patterns of behaviour? 
This may be done by checking out wider interpretations of 
importance beyond the project team, considering whether the 
impact or issue is starting to affect other areas of programming 
and hence is clearly becoming of broader importance (i.e. 
connections to other areas).  
d. Decide how the project needs to respond to this change. 
Document the decision and consider how it relates to the core 
causal pathway.  Revise as per step 1. 
48 One approach to ensuring that decisions are made and implications followed through into practice in a 
related but more focused area for managing responding to clients in MFIs is The Practice Guide on the 
Feedback Loop produced by the Imp-Act Consortium.  
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impact assessment.  This does not mean that other methodologies such 
as RCTs, modelling or other quantitative methods are not also relevant to 
particular projects to answer particular types of questions.  It does offer a basis 
for capturing the types of issues that FSD is regularly dealing with and trying 
to understand, in its bid to achieve its programme goals and hence impact on 
the financial sector.     
The proposed approach for projects can be undertaken at the programme level 
and could form the basis of the proposed annual impact synthesis report as an 
annual review of programme performance which the Knowledge team will 
be producing in the coming months.  The analysis produced from the above 
overview would offer a systematic review of the pathways to impact of the 
existing portfolio - or at least the major projects.  It would provide a framework 
for the overall synthesis report into which other evaluations and studies would 
also feed.  These other studies would also contribute understanding of how 
FSD’s impact on the sector is evolving. 
3.2  WORKING RETROSPECTIVELY
3.2.1  Evaluating retrospectively 
Retrospective evaluation applies to projects where an evaluation or impact 
assessment is to be carried out – usually ex-post without necessarily having 
engaged in the above on-going approach. Where the approach to prospective 
evaluation has been implemented as proposed in the previous section then 
there will be a richer set of data with which to explore impact pathways and 
assess contribution through the approach laid out below.  
An approach to evaluating retrospectively is given in Box A2.
The retrospective methodology focuses initially on using and triangulating 
a number of accounts of the project or programme from different 
stakeholders and seeks to explore what happened, why and what was 
relevant in the wider context. 
It builds on the notion of path dependence – how actions, outcomes and 
impacts build on each other over time. It explores the fine-grained detail 
of the implementation story. It does not assume a linear or incremental 
theory of change but tries to abstract how change actually happened.
The method has similarities to process tracing. While process tracing seeks 
to compare what happened to what the theory of change said would 
happen, this method does not impose a priori any theory of implementation 
or theory of change, but simply seeks to explore what happened. 
Apart from the idea of tracing, what this method shares with process 
tracing is that progress is compared with the longer-term goals and 
aspirations of the project – what impact was intended, what the project 
was contributing to and working towards.
Data collection
To have rigour, it is important that the accounts come from differing types 
of stakeholders and players and ideally people from different levels and 
perspectives. It is clear that people to a degree tell the story from their 
own perspective, favouring their own agency and likely over-attributing 
to the project given that the origins of the evaluators are known.  But 
triangulation provides perspective and offers new avenues of inquiry. 
Triangulation should therefore purposefully seek out views from those on 
the edges or with little direct interest in the project.  
  This starts with questions pertaining to the ‘backstory’ – what led up 
to the project, what had happened prior to that, both in the context 
where the project was to be implemented, and in the relevant 
organisations (had similar projects been implemented elsewhere?). 
Discussions as to what was happening in the wider context and what 
other players were doing are also explored.
  The history of the project is then followed either to its end or up to 
the present. There is a chance to check details between interviewees, 
to explore differences of perspective.
  These verbal accounts are also triangulated with project documents 
and any other relevant documents.
  Final questions focus on impact – what had been intended, what 
was achieved (both in terms of outcomes and impact), what else 
was achieved that had not initially been intended.
  And contribution – how did the project contribute, how did particular 
features of the project contribute, what else contributed.
Box A2: Evaluating retrospectively using stakeholder accounts of the project49 
49 This approach has similarities with the approach taken by OPM in the impact assessment of FSD’s programme in 2009.  However, that approach particularly involved discussion of a counter-factual scenario with project 
beneficiaries that is not the focus here.  The approach then also involved getting views of a wide range of stakeholders.  This approach emphasises the need to do this in ways that much more explicitly explore the patterns of 
change and factors supporting them and how the project does or does not interact with these.  
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3.2.2  Complexity-informed qualitative methods for large ‘n’ 
projects
This evaluation approach suggests similar methods for considering how to 
assess impact where the unit of analysis is, for example, an SG, an individual 
or a SME.
Exploring impact at these levels would involve examining the trajectory 
of events, interactions and outcomes for the unit of analysis in question 
(individuals or organisations – e.g. groups, SMEs), including emerging, 
unexpected or unintended effects.  This would be undertaken using primarily 
qualitative methods.  An approach may be developed using the notion of critical 
moments or junctures to probe particular times which stand out in the minds 
of interviewees as of particular significance – where there were convergences 
and synergistic events and the potential for step change. The interviews can 
then reveal whether such moments were seized and a contribution made or 
whether the opportunities were either lost or where the hoped-for changes 
did not materialise.  While this approach starts from these critical moments 
(and experience with this method has showed that interviewees in general 
have a very good recall of such moments and have no difficulty relating to 
the concept), the method also then allows further explorations to trace the 
slowly-shifting trends, interweaving of influences and intentions that might 
have built up to these points.
Interviews would be undertaken broadly along the lines discussed in the box 
above in which interviewees are asked to discuss how the intervention has 
‘built the ground’ or tried to create or respond to ‘critical junctures’. Specific 
exploration can also be carried out as to what else was contributing to them.
Purposive sampling can be undertaken on the basis of the existing 
understanding of the diversity of impacts occurring, since the purpose is to 
understand the diverse ways in which change occurs, for whom, how and why. 
This evidence can be used to assess the strength of a change in patterns –if 
the apparently weakest cases present clear evidence for a change in patterns 
this would more strongly support an overall assessment that patterns have 
changed.  
In the situation of ‘large n’, for example, to assess what the impact of SGs 
has been on individual livelihoods, a proposed approach is given in the box 
below.
Analysis
From these accounts, a narrative can be constructed which seeks to 
capture critical junctures in the project and also tracks the influences and 
dynamics of the periods where less seems to be achieved, but where the 
project is attempting to persevere in what we have called ‘building the 
ground’.
From this narrative, there may be particular issues to explore in more 
detail, or particular hypotheses to investigate as to what was happening 
and why. These can be explored through further interviews, through 
returning to some of those already interviewed and also through 
exploring relevant written records. This ‘second pass’ is an important 
feature of the methodology and often results in new information and 
new perspectives.
It was interesting to note that respondents feel very comfortable in 
framing change as a mixture of phases: ‘building the ground’, moving 
forwards (or not) at ‘critical junctures’. Use of ‘critical junctures’ has 
similarities to the method of capturing ‘most significant change’ – but 
it pays more attention to the way several factors come together – and 
it does not require these critical moments to be positive – i.e. they 
could be moments of collapse, moments where severe set backs were 
experienced.  These can be explored in some detail where the dynamic 
approach to evaluation has been implemented, as a richer data set of 
conditions and emerging features surrounding the project’s progress will 
be available. 
The method is evaluative in that it traces the narrative of the project. But 
it also leads into explorations of impact  - and can help to identify what 
quantitative measures of impact would support the assessment – e.g. 
if the aims of the project are in part to impact interest rates, it would 
be useful to obtain data on interest rate movements during the course 
of the project.
Box A2 continued
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   Use purposive sampling to explore the heterogeneity of impact - this 
might be e.g. in areas where the programme is known to have been 
more and less successful through its output or outcome monitoring 
data; within different levels of use of the programme; across gender, 
poverty levels etc.  
   Undertake qualitative interviews also using purposive sampling (e.g. 
of SGs and their members who are known to be performing more/less 
well) which focus on exploring chronologies and critical junctures. 
Again using critical junctures as moments through which to explore 
the broader range of influences and events that were occurring 
and that contributed to this.  This approach could take a two-way 
approach to cross checking the importance of the intervention:
 ¶  First, ask in open ended ways about what has been happening in 
the life and livelihood of the individual over the relevant recent 
time period (e.g. two years).  Explore these for critical moments 
and the trends and events that built up to and surrounded them.
 ¶  Second, undertake a chronology of the individual’s engagement 
with the intervention in question.  Ask about critical moments in 
relation to this intervention and explore the issues around them.
 ¶  The relationship between the two sets of critical junctures 
and their related conditions are then used to contextualise the 
importance of the intervention to the life and livelihood of the 
participant and analyse its contribution. [NB.  This method has not 
yet been tested].
   Data collection at the context level such as the village through e.g. 
FGDs, and key-informant interviews would also explore the timeline 
around the intervention, what else was happening and what critical 
moments have occurred and what other conditions related to these 
at this broader level over the relevant period. 
   Analyse this data for:
 ¶  The outcomes related to the planned pathway and how these differ 
among participants using analysis of how their participation has 
been ‘building the ground’ for them as individuals or contributing 
to ‘critical junctures’ in their lives.
 ¶  Identify the types of critical junctures that the respondents 
experience and also analyse whether and how these relate to 
unintended or unexpected outcomes of the project and their 
connection to other dynamics of change.
 ¶  Analyse the extent of the relationship / interactions between the 
way ‘critical junctures’ and ‘building the ground’ have occurred 
in their lives, how these relate to the intervention and how they 
relate to wider processes of change.
 ¶  Analyse the types / nature / conditions of ‘critical junctures’ and 
‘building the ground’ in the relationship they show between the 
intervention and outcomes/impact experienced. 
 ¶  Once types of juncture / building the ground have been identified 
and the conditions in which they operate have been identified, 
analyse contributory causes using techniques such as qualitative 
comparative analysis to identify patterns of these.
   Draw conclusions about: 
 ¶  The conditions in which the programme operates.
 ¶  The nature of change evident, for whom and under what conditions, 
and their relative importance in the lives of participants.
 ¶  The nature of interaction and synergy between impact pathways 
both evident and emerging and the implications of this for the 
sustainability of impact into the future.   
The findings as to the nature of junctures and building the ground and 
their conditions could then be fed into wider surveys or on-going impact 
monitoring.  These would require the identification of indicators that 
appear to be related to these occurrences and indicators of conditions in 
which they appear to take place.  This then has the potential to pick up 
particular types of indicator e.g. of behaviour change that relate to the 
use of the intervention and lead to the quantitative analysis of patterns 
of change.
Box A3 :  A complexity-informed qualitative method for investigating impact in large ‘n’ projects
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